Guzman v. Wheeler
Guzman v. Wheeler
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-11071 Summary Calendar
ADAM GUZMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EDDIE WHEELER; CAROLYN A. POPE; CHARLES BELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 1:96-CV-52 - - - - - - - - - - February 20, 1998 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Adam Guzman, Texas prisoner # 667535, appeals from the
dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983complaint for failure to state
a claim. Guzman’s challenge to a disciplinary charge, which was
later overturned, fails to state a constitutional violation.
Sandin v. Connor,
515 U.S. 472, 484(1995); Luken v. Scott,
71 F.3d 192, 193(5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1690(1996). Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not err in
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 96-11071 -2-
dismissing that claim. The dismissal of Guzman’s challenge to
the disciplinary case is AFFIRMED.
The magistrate judge’s dismissal of Guzman’s failure-to-
protect claim, however, was error. In the dismissal, the
magistrate judge cited Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1), and “42 [sic] U.S.C. 1915(c)(2).” Because the
dismissal was prior to service of process or any Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the most appropriate authority for such a dismissal is
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), because Rule 12(b)(6) contemplates that
there will be a motion to dismiss the complaint. For the
purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that the
standard of review for a § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal based on
failure to state a claim is de novo. See Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d 1483, 1485, 1489-90(11th Cir. 1997).
To establish a failure-to-protect claim, the plaintiff must
show that he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to his need for protection." Neals v.
Norwood,
59 F.3d 530, 533(5th Cir. 1995). A prison official
acts with deliberate indifference if he knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837(1994). No. 96-11071 -3-
Although the magistrate judge stated that there is nothing
in the record to indicate that the prison authorities were put on
notice, Guzman alleged in his complaint and again at the Spears
hearing that he had notified prison authorities prior to the
first attack and that he had notified them again after the second
attack. His prison file also contains his request for
safekeeping and a transfer prior to the first alleged attack.
Regardless, the lower court “may not use prison records to
counter a plaintiff’s Spears testimony.” Varnado v. Lynaugh,
920 F.2d 320, 321(5th Cir. 1991). Guzman’s factual allegations
in his complaint and his testimony during the Spears hearing
presented facts that are not baseless, and they could show a
constitutional violation if the prison officials failed to take
reasonable measures to protect him. Accordingly, the dismissal
of Guzman’s failure-to-protect claim for failure to state a claim
was error. The dismissal of Guzman’s failure-to-protect claim is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for
further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished