UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-30536 Summary Calendar

PAUL O. IWENJIORA; CHRISTOPHER ERUCHALU; GARRY LEE ROBERSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, VERSUS ELMER LITCHFIELD, ET AL., Defendants, ELMER LITCHFIELD, Sheriff, of East of Baton Rouge Parish, JOE SABELLA, Warden, of East Baton Rouge Parish Prison; ANN LEMOINE, Prison Health Care Manager, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Middle District of Louisiana (93-CV-278) April 15, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:* Paul Iwenjiora, Christopher Eruchalu, and Garry Roberson, all

former inmates at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, filed a suit

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Elmer Litchfield, Warden

Joseph Sabella, and several other corrections officials in which

they alleged various violations of their Eighth Amendment

protections against cruel and unusual punishment.2 Specifically,

they alleged that they contracted tuberculosis from a fellow inmate

because the prison’s screening and control procedures for

infectious disease were constitutionally inadequate. The

plaintiffs further alleged that after they tested positive for

tuberculosis, the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference

to their medical needs by failing to dispense appropriate

medications and by ignoring their medical complaints. On

recommendation by the magistrate judge, the district court granted

summary judgment for the defendants and entered a final judgment in

their favor. The plaintiffs timely filed notice of appeal. We

affirm.

Litchfield and Sabella are the only defendants named in the present appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.3 Summary

judgment is proper only if the evidence shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 A thorough and

independent review of the record convinces us that Litchfield and

Sabella are entitled to summary judgment.

To have survived a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs

were required to proffer evidence that raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to their serious medical needs.5 Much of the evidence

adduced by the plaintiffs in opposition to Litchfield’s and

Sabella’s motion, though, was unauthenticated and therefore

inadmissible.6 We have stated that “unauthenticated documents are Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).

Among the exhibits attached to the plaintiffs’ memorandum were confidential prison investigation reports concerning irregularities in the dispensation of medications to prisoners. improper as summary judgment evidence.”7 Accordingly, we are

permitted to consider only competent evidence in reviewing the

propriety of the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the

defendants’ behalf. Considering only competent evidence, it is

clear to us that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of

raising a genuine issue of material fact.8 In simple terms, the

evidence does not demonstrate that either of the defendants knew of

and disregarded an excessive health risk to the plaintiffs.9 Any

other claims are considered abandoned by virtue of the plaintiffs’

failure adequately to brief and argue them on appeal.10 Litchfield

and Sabella were entitled to summary judgment.

None, however, were accompanied by authenticating certifications from the custodian of records.

King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).

Even if we were able to consider all of the plaintiffs’ evidence, it is doubtful that they could have survived summary judgment.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). See also Varnado at 321 (mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice do not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action).

See Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

AFFIRMED.