IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________

m 98-10175 _______________

JIMMY-JACK JACKAI, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:93-CV-2084-R) _________________________

November 12, 1999

Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and discriminated against on account of race. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. It appears undisputed that Wilkins, who PER CURIAM:* trained Jackai, was racially biased. Based on the evidence, the jury could have believed that Dallas County, Texas, appeals a judgment Wilkins intentionally gave Jackai inadequate entered on a verdict for Jimmy-Jack Jackai, training and gave better training to Dwight who sued for discrimination under title VII Rottenberg, who is white. There is evidence after his employment was terminated. Jackai, that once trained, Jackai was given inadequate who is black, alleges race discrimination. facilities for his work and may have received inadequate further training on a crucial The county’s main issue on appeal is its computer program with which Jackai had claim that the evidence is insufficient to difficulty. Although Rottenberg, like Jackai, support the verdict. Although there is no received negative performance reviews, Jackai direct evidence of discrimination (except for was terminated, while Rottenberg was not. the apparent racial prejudice of Roy Wilkins, who was not involved in the decision to As explained in his brief, “[o]ne of terminate Jackai), and the circumstantial Plaintiff’s theories of the case is that he was evidence is far from overwhelming, we set up to fail in Dallas County Data Services conclude that the evidence is sufficient for a because he was a black man who had had the reasonable juror to find that Jackai was temerity to challenge Dallas County’s refusal to hire him for positions to which he was qualified.” Because of the difficulties Jackai * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has faced not only directly at the hands of Wilkins, determined that this opinion should not be published but also on the job once he was no longer and is not precedent except under the limited being trained by Wilkins, the jury could have circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. believed there was a plan afoot to undermine Jackai’s career with Dallas County.

As the county acknowledges, a verdict must be upheld unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp.,

(5th Cir. 1997). Considering, as we must, all inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient, if only barely.

The county also challenges the award of attorney’s fees. We find no clear error in the district court’s assessment of fees.

In summary, given the high degree of deference we accord to jury verdicts, we see no reversible error in the judgment. The same is AFFIRMED.

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