IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-40196 Summary Calendar

NOEL GONZALEZ; RUDY MOLINA; ENRIQUE MENDIOLA; HILARIO ACEVEDO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS; THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, Chief Justice; RAUL A. GONZALEZ; NATHAN I. HECHT, Justice, Individually and official capacities; DEBORAH G. HANKINSON, Justice Individually and official capacity; CRAIG ENOCH, Justice Individually and official capacity; ROSE SPECTOR, Justice in their individual and official capacity; PRICILLA R. OWEN; JAMES A. BAKER, Justice Individually and official capacity; GREG ABBOTT, Individually and in his official capacity; DAN MORALES, Attorney General, Individually and in his official capacity; BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF TEXAS; RACHEL MARTIN, Executive director of Texas Board of Law Examiners; ROBERT ROLLER, Chairman, Texas Board of Law Examiners; individually and in their official capacity; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of USDC No. B-98-CV-28 --------------------

December 9, 1999

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Noel Gonzalez, Rudy Molina, Enrique Mediola, and Hilario

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 99-40196 -2-

Acevedo appeal the dismissal of their federal anti-trust claim.

Plaintiffs, by and through an attorney, filed suit in district

court against 15 defendants who represented the Supreme Court of

Texas, the Board of Law Examiners of Texas, and the Office of

Attorney General of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that these

entities and their representatives, in both their individual and

official capacities, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,

and 2, when they denied plaintiffs admission to the

Texas bar by using a system for grading bar examinations which

was not approved by the Texas Supreme Court.

This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction on its

own motion if necessary. Mosley v. Cozby,

(5th

Cir. 1987). An examination of the record in this case discloses

that no final judgment has been entered as a separate document as

required by FED. R. CIV. P. 58.

In an order entered on November 4, 1998, the district court

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thereafter, on

December 4, 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration.

On January 15, 1999, the district court entered an order denying

the motion for reconsideration. On February 16, 1999, plaintiffs

filed a notice of appeal.

If we were to treat the November 4th order as a Rule 58

judgment, plaintiffs’ notice of appeal would be untimely because

it was filed more than 30 days after entry of the order of

dismissal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Baker v. Mercedes

Benz of North America,

(5th Cir. 1997).

Therefore, we DISMISS the appeal. See Townsend v. Lucas, 745 No. 99-40196 -3-

F.2d 933, 934 (5th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiffs may rectify the lack of a separate document

judgment by a motion to the district court for entry of judgment.

After entry of the judgment, they may appeal within the time

prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A).

APPEAL DISMISSED.