Brien v. Equitable Life
Brien v. Equitable Life
Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60416 Summary Calendar
JANICE SHERMAN BRIEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
EQUITABLE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES; WILLIE L. McINTOSH; DON BROWN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 3:97-CV-735-BN March 17, 2000 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant, Janice Sherman Brien appeals the summary
judgment for Defendants-Appellees, Equitable Assurance Society of
the United States, Willie L. McIntosh and Don Brown (collectively
“Equitable”) in her suit for damages allegedly occasioned by
Equitable’s bad faith in delaying payments on her disability
insurance claim. We affirm.
Brien submitted a claim in 1994, stating that she was totally
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 disabled2 from performing her work as a dentist because she was
experiencing double vision. Equitable paid Brien monthly
disability benefits of $3000 for approximately three years. In
June 1997, after a review of Brien’s medical records and an
independent medical examination (“IME”), Equitable determined that
Brien was not totally disabled under the terms of the policy, but
invited Brien and her physician to submit any additional
information that would support her claim. In September 1997, Brien
filed the instant suit. In January 1998, Equitable reinstated
Brien’s benefits and paid all benefits which had accrued in the six
months since its June 1997 decision to suspend payments. The
district court granted Equitable’s motion for summary judgment on
the only remaining issues in the suit: Brien’s claim for punitive
damages and extra-contractual damages for mental anguish, attorneys
fees and interest.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo,
31 F.3d 285, 289(5th Cir.
1994), and affirm summary judgment only if the movant demonstrated
that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(c). This action, properly removed from a Mississippi state
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires the application of Mississippi substantive law.
Brien asserts on appeal that summary judgment proof
2 Brien’s policy paid benefits only in the event she suffered total disability. To the extent that the evidence supported a finding of partial disability, Brien was entitled to no payment under the policy.
2 established a genuine issue of fact on her claim for punitive
damages resulting from a bad faith denial of insurance benefits.
In order to recover punitive damages under Mississippi law, a
plaintiff must establish that (1) the insurer lacked an “arguable
or legitimate reason” for denying a benefit claim and (2) the
insurer committed a willful or malicious wrong or acted with gross
and reckless disregard for the insured’s rights. Dunn v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
927 F.2d 869, 872(5th Cir. 1991). In order
to recover punitive damages, the insured must prove both of these
elements. See Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Bristow,
529 So.2d 620, 622(Miss. 1988).
There is no dispute in this record that Equitable had a
legitimate or arguable reason for denying Brien’s benefits. An
arguable reason has been defined as one in support of which there
is some credible evidence. See Guy v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.,
894 F.2d 1407, 1411(5th Cir. 1990). The existence of evidence to
the contrary does not deprive an insurer of its “arguable reason.”
See
id.Equitable’s decision that Brien was not totally disabled
relied on the medical opinion of its in-house physician as well as
the report from Brien’s IME. Brien’s evidence, consisting of
medical records from other physicians and reliance on discrete
portions of the IME that contravened Equitable’s conclusions, does
not create a fact question concerning Equitable’s arguable basis
for its actions.
With regard to Brien’s actual damage claims for emotional
distress and attorneys’ fees, the district court held that, under
3 Mississippi law, extra-contractual compensatory damages are not
recoverable in the absence of facts justifying a punitive damage
award. Brien challenges this holding by citing Universal Life Ins.
Co. v. Veasley,
610 So.2d 290(Miss. 1992), which allowed mental
anguish damages for a plaintiff in the absence of punitive damages.
While we agree that the district court’s reliance on pre-Veasley
Mississippi law on this point was in error, we nevertheless affirm
summary judgment for Equitable on this point because the record
contains no evidence to support an award for mental anguish or
attorney fees.
Finally, Brien complains that the district court failed to
consider her claim for prejudgment interest. Because there was no
judgment entered for Brien, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to award Brien interest on a zero judgment.
See Larr v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
924 F.2d 65, 67(5th Cir.
1991)(holding that, under Mississippi law, the award of prejudgment
interest is within the discretion of the district court); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)(1994)(“Interest shall be allowed on any money
judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary judgment for
Equitable.
AFFIRMED.
4
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished