Paige v. Cochran

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Paige v. Cochran

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-20236 Summary Calendar _____________________

CHRISTINE PAIGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GARY COCHRAN; CITY OF BAYTOWN,

Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-96-CV-978 _________________________________________________________________ April 7, 2000

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Christine Paige appeals the district court’s grant of judgment

as a matter of law dismissing her

42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims against

the City of Baytown. Paige contends that Baytown failed to conduct

an adequate investigation of her complaint that a Baytown police

officer, Gary Cochran, raped her.

This court reviews a judgment as a matter of law de novo. See

Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,

119 F.3d 305, 313

(5th Cir. 1997).

Judgment as a matter of law is proper only when “there is no

legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. for that party on that issue.” FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1). The record

is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion. See Burch,

119 F.3d at 313

.

A municipality may be liable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

for the

actions of non-policymaking employees only if those actions were

taken pursuant to an official policy of the municipality. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978).

Paige contends, however, that § 1983 provides an independent cause

of action against a municipality for failure to investigate

constitutional misconduct by police officers. We need not reach

this issue. Regardless of whether such a cause of action exists,

and regardless of what standard we might apply in determining what

constitutes an adequate investigation, the district court’s

decision was correct; no reasonable factfinder could have found

that Baytown failed to investigate or that the investigation was so

inadequate as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1). Further, there is no evidence of any Baytown

policy to conduct inadequate investigations of alleged

constitutional violations by its personnel. Accordingly, we AFFIRM

the judgment of the district court.

A F F I R M E D.

2

Reference

Status
Unpublished