United States v. Penado-Ramos
United States v. Penado-Ramos
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _____________________ No. 99-20794 Summary Calendar _____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSÉ ATADEO PENADO-RAMOS, also known as José Atadeo Ramirez-Penado, also known as José Atadeo Penado, also known as José Attado Ramox, also known as José Attado Ramos, also known as José A. Ramos, also known as José Ramos, also known as José Ataded Penado, also known as José Aladeo Penado-Ramos, also known as José Atadeo, also known as José Avadeo Penado-Ramos, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-99-CR-201-ALL _________________________________________________________________ June 1, 2000 Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:* José Atadeo Penado-Ramos appeals his conviction for illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). He argues that: (1) the indictment was insufficient for failing to allege an * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. element of intent; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the evidence indicated that he reasonably believed that his reentry was lawful and because he established a defense of entrapment by estoppel; and (3) specific intent is a material element of an offense under § 1326. He concedes that his specific intent argument is foreclosed by this court’s holding in United States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1996).
This court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. See United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999). An indictment must allege each material element of the offense in order to be sufficient. See id. Because intent is not a material element of a violation of § 1326, Penado- Ramos’s challenge fails. See id. at 143-44, 144 n.7.
This court also reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1344 (1999). Penado- Ramos’s argument that he reasonably believed that his reentry was lawful does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his guilty verdict because such a belief is not a defense to criminal liability under § 1326. See United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1036 (5th Cir. 1997); Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d at 68.
Furthermore, a defense of entrapment by estoppel is not available to Penado-Ramos because there was no evidence, nor has he alleged,
that he was induced to rely on an affirmative misrepresentation of the law by a government official. See Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d at 69.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is A F F I R M E D.
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