IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-60351 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JERRY LEE QUINN,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:96-CV-63-S USDC No. 3:95-CR-83-ALL-S - - - - - - - - - - August 9, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jerry Lee Quinn, federal prisoner #10312-042, appeals the

district court’s denial of his

motion to vacate

his sentence. The district court granted Quinn a certificate of

appealability (COA) on only one of the five issues he presents in

his appeal brief: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the use of his state conviction as the predicate for

his federal conviction under

(g)(1). Quinn failed

to request a COA for the other issues he has briefed (and for

which COA was not granted). Thus, they are not properly before

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 99-60351 -2-

this court. See United States v. Kimler,

(5th

Cir. 1998); Lackey v. Johnson,

(5th Cir. 1997).

Quinn was convicted of violating § 922(g)(1), which

prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been

convicted in any court of [] a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1). “[C]rime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is

defined in § 921(a)(20), which provides in pertinent part:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

(a)(20).

Quinn argues that his state conviction did not result in the

loss of his civil rights and thus that his rights were “restored”

within the meaning of § 921(a)(20). He also contends that

because the restoration did not expressly prohibit possession of

firearms, he could not be prosecuted under § 922(g)(1). Standing

alone, Quinn’s claim that his civil rights were not lost does not

exclude him from the ambit of the federal statute; it applies as

long as the state prohibits a felon from possessing firearms.

Quinn’s argument regarding where in the state code the

firearms ban occurs is also without merit. Any “restoration” of

Quinn’s civil rights is irrelevant given Mississippi law’s

prohibition of possession of a firearm by a felon. See Miss.

Stat. Ann. § 97-37-5(1). This prohibition triggers the “unless No. 99-60351 -3-

clause” of § 921(a)(20) and satisfies the predicate for the

federal prosecution of Quinn. See Caron v. United States,

(1998). Quinn’s argument that the Mississippi

statute is ineffective because it stands apart from any

restoration provision is also without merit. As he argues that

his “restoration” operates by virtue of his never having lost his

civil rights, there would be no applicable statutory provision to

which the firearms possession bar could be tied.

Although a person who has been convicted of a felony in

Mississippi may apply to the court in which he was convicted for

a certificate of rehabilitation, a procedure which apparently

restores his right to bear firearms, see

-

5(3), Quinn does not allege and the record does not indicate that

he had applied for or received such a certificate. Thus, Quinn

cannot show that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge

the use of his state conviction as a predicate for a conviction

under § 922(g). See Strickland v. Washington,

(1984).

Quinn’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED. His

arguments require only statutory construction and thus would be

unaided by the inclusion of further pleadings.

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.