IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 99-31124 Summary Calendar _____________________

OAK RIDGE PARK, INC.; ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

OAK RIDGE PARK, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY; ET AL.,

Defendants,

SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 98-CV-3348-N _________________________________________________________________ September 29, 2000

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This appeal presents an insurance coverage case under

Louisiana law. The plaintiffs, Quarter House Oak Ridge Park, Inc.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. (“ORP”) and Quarter House Home Owners’ Association (“Quarter

House”) seek review of the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for the defendants, Scottsdale Insurance Company

(“Scottsdale”) and United Fire and Casualty Company (“United”),

which dismissed the plaintiffs’ bad faith claims.1 Specifically,

the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding

that the underlying lawsuits against the plaintiffs did not fall

within the insurance coverage provided by the defendants. We find

no error on the part of the district court and affirm.

A

The case has its genesis in two separate lawsuits filed

against the plaintiffs. The first suit was filed by Louisiana

Acorn Fair Housing (the “Acorn” suit). It alleged intentional

discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act,

, et seq., and the Louisiana Open Housing Act, La.Rev.Stat.

§ 51:2601., et seq. Specifically, Acorn alleged that ORP

“willfully,” ”maliciously,” and “intentionally” committed acts of

discrimination (based on race, religion, familial status and

national origin) in connection with the sale of real estate.2 The

second suit was filed by Richard J. Danenhower, a former field

1 The plaintiffs do not seek review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, Coregis Insurance Company (“Coregis”). 2 The Acorn suit was settled prior to trial.

2 marketing manager for ORP. It alleged violations of the Fair

Housing Act and the Louisiana Open Housing Act similar to those

alleged in the Acorn litigation. Specifically, Danenhower alleged

that he was required to train employees to carry out discriminatory

policies by presenting tours to a select group of “qualified”

prospective buyers based on race, religion, handicap, national

origin, and familial status. Because of these illegal practices,

Danenhower alleged, he was forced to resign.3 Danenhower sought

damages for loss of wages, humiliation, embarrassment, emotional

distress, mental anguish and ridicule.4 In both instances, the

defendants denied coverage to ORP and Quarter House.

On November 10, 1998, ORP and Quarter House filed the instant

suit against Scottsdale, United, and Coregis. The plaintiffs

alleged that its insurers wrongfully denied them a defense and

coverage in both the Acorn and Danenhower litigation.5 Following

a hearing, on September 17, 1999, the district court granted

3 Additionally, Danenhower alleges that he was slandered by ORP in a public statement issued by ORP in response to a television broadcast showing Danenhower instructing a putative marketing trainee to discriminate in accordance with ORP’s “policies.” 4 Following removal to federal court, Danenhower’s suit was dismissed for lack of standing to pursue the federal claims, and declination to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state law claims. Subsequent to the district court’s dismissal, Danenhower re-filed in state court. That state court action is still pending. 5 The bad faith claims stemming from the Danenhower litigation are limited to the federal action that was dismissed. No claims are brought with respect to the ongoing state court action.

3 summary judgment for the insurers. The plaintiffs filed a timely

notice of appeal.

B

After consideration of the briefs and the record, we hold that

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the

defendants. Louisiana law is clear: “The insurer’s duty to defend

is determined solely from the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the policy,

without consideration of extraneous evidence.” Selective Ins. Co.

of Southeast v. J.B. Mouton & Sons, Inc.,

(5th

Cir. 1992)(citing Jensen v. Snellings,

(5th Cir.

1988); Alombro v. Salman,

(La.Ct.App. 1988)).

The allegations contained in the complaint are to be liberally

construed and the rights of the insured are to be deemed paramount.

See Jensen,

. However, if after examining the

allegation in the complaint, coverage under the policy is

precluded, the insurer is relieved of its duty to defend. See

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo,

(5th Cir.

1994)(citing Jensen,

).

Turning first to the coverage provided by the Scottsdale

policy, we think that the district court correctly concluded that

in the Acorn litigation, the acts alleged against the plaintiffs

were acts that were “intended or expected”; thus, they do not “fall

under the definition of ‘occurrence’ contained in the policy.”

Additionally, the plaintiffs have failed to identify any property

4 damages, bodily injuries, or personal injuries that are alleged by

the Acorn plaintiffs that arguably fall within the policy.

Finally, with respect to the Danenhower litigation, all of the

claims arose out of employment-related policies or acts that were

“unambiguously precluded under the Scottsdale employment-related

policy exclusion.” Thus, the district court was correct in

concluding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to coverage under

the Scottsdale policy.

With respect to the United policy, coverage in the Acorn

litigation was denied by United for the same reasons that it was

denied by Scottsdale under its policy--the policy excluded coverage

for intentional acts, which were the only acts alleged in the Acorn

litigation. Further, as in the Scottsdale policy, the United

policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury and property damage

caused by employment-related practices. As far as the Danenhower

suit is concerned, the record is bereft of any evidence indicating

that the suit was ever tendered by the plaintiffs to United for

defense. Even assuming, however, that United had “constructive

notice” of the Danenhower suit, as the plaintiffs argue, coverage

was expressly excluded by the “employment-related practices

exclusion.” Thus, the district court was correct in concluding

that “United bore no duty to defend ORP in the Danenhower suit.”

The judgment of the district court is therefore

A F F I R M E D.

5 6