Laughlin v. Cardiovascular Inst
Laughlin v. Cardiovascular Inst
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30938
SUSAN LAUGHLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CARDIOVASCULAR INSTITUTE OF THE SOUTH, a Professional Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (USDC No. 99-CV-9092-G) _______________________________________________________ March 8, 2001
Before REAVLEY, SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant Susan Laughlin appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment for defendant Cardiovascular Institute of the South (CIS). To be
entitled to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 2601-2654, an employee must give the employer notice sufficient to reasonably
apprise the employer of a request to take time off for a serious health condition. See
Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
135 F.3d 973, 980(5th Cir. 1998). Notice
must be given as soon as is practicable. See
29 C.F.R. § 825.303. The notice
should be sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-
qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. See
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). Laughlin initially asked CIS for leave on December 3, 1998.
Laughlin’s social worker Gail Aycock filled out a FMLA medical-certification form
indicating that Laughlin would return to work on January 4, after a month of leave.
CIS granted Laughlin’s leave.
On January 3, 1999 Both Laughlin and her husband Patrick Laughlin talked
to CIS employee John Chromy during a phone call and told him that Laughlin
needed more time, but said nothing about her health condition or how long she
expected to be out. The next day Laughlin resigned without arguing for her job or
making it clear that she was seeking FMLA-protected leave.
Although Laughlin’s initial request for FMLA leave was sufficient notice to
CIS under the FMLA, her later request for an extension was not. It was not
adequate to inform CIS that Laughlin was requesting FMLA-qualifying leave. See
Satterfield,
135 F.3d at 981(holding that an employee’s communication that she
2 was “sick” and “having a lot of pain in her side” was insufficient notice under the
FMLA). Indeed, Chromy testified that he was unaware that Laughlin was
requesting an extension of her FMLA leave and that he would have given her an
extension had he known she wanted it.
AFFIRMED.
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished