United States v. Hamlin

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States v. Hamlin

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40966 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VAL ROY HAMLIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. M-96-CR-36-1 -------------------- November 28, 2001

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Val Roy Hamlin appeals his conviction for conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute 17 kilograms of cocaine.

Hamlin argues that the district court abused its discretion by

rejecting a plea agreement based on the court’s violation of the

attorney-client privilege. The district court did not violate the

attorney-client privilege and did not abuse its discretion in

rejecting the plea agreement. United States v. Crowell,

60 F.3d 199, 205-06

(5th Cir. 1995).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 98-40966 -2-

Hamlin argues that the district court abused its discretion by

instructing the jury that Hamlin had raised the affirmative defense

of withdrawal from the conspiracy and that Hamlin had the burden of

showing that he completely withdrew. Hamlin’s counsel requested

the instruction, which was indistinguishable from the Fifth Circuit

pattern instruction. The court did not err in giving the

instruction as requested. See United States v. Gonzalez,

700 F.2d 196

, 201 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (no plain error where court instructed

jury as counsel requested); see also United States v. Fotovich,

885 F.2d 241, 242

(5th Cir. 1989) (unobjected-to use of pattern jury

instruction was not plain error).

Hamlin argues that Bobby Flores, his lead counsel, rendered

ineffective assistance. Because Hamlin’s ineffectiveness claims

were not presented to the district court, the record is

insufficient to permit evaluation of these claims on direct appeal.

See United States v. Cornett,

195 F.3d 776

, 781 n.2 (5th Cir.

1999); United States v. Navejar,

963 F.2d 732, 735

(5th Cir. 1992).

Hamlin contends that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that

Hamlin’s participation in the conspiracy were established beyond a

reasonable doubt. United States v. Brown,

186 F.3d 661, 664

(5th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Myers,

104 F.3d 76, 78

(5th Cir.

1997).

Hamlin contends that the prosecution committed misconduct by

using false evidence to indict and to convict him and by

suppressing evidence. The argument concerning false grand jury No. 98-40966 -3-

testimony, raised here for the first time, is fatally vague and

unsupported. Hamlin fails to show plain error or any effect on his

substantial rights. See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 730-36

(1993). The district court excluded the allegedly false

trial evidence; it cannot support a misconduct claim. The record

does not show that any material evidence was suppressed. See

Lawrence v. Lensing,

42 F.3d 255, 257

(5th Cir. 1994).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Reference

Status
Unpublished