Pennell v. Massengil
Pennell v. Massengil
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40277 Conference Calendar
CRAIG DUANE PENNELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANDY MASSENGIL; JANICE O’GUINN; R. PROCTOR, Head of Class,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 5:99-CV-76 -------------------- December 11, 2001 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Craig Pennell, Texas inmate #704801, appeals the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his
42 U.S.C. § 1983failure-to-protect claim. We review a grant of
summary judgment applying the same standard as the court below.
Deas v. River West, L.P.,
152 F.3d 471, 475(5th Cir. 1998).
To establish a failure-to-protect claim, Pennell must show
that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his need for protection.” Neals v. Norwood, 59
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 01-40277 -2-
F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). “In order to act with deliberate
indifference, ‘the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Id.(quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837(1994)). A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference “only if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”
Farmer,
511 U.S. at 847.
Pennell’s argument that the district court erred is premised
on his conclusion that the basis for the district court’s summary
judgment was the absence of proof that Pennell had acquired
administrative-segregation status on the date of the attack. He
argues that this determination by the district court was
erroneous because (1) the defendants removed from the documents
submitted to the district court the “I-169" form signed by Warden
Massengill on December 18, 1997, which placed him in
administrative segregation; (2) the evidence submitted by the
defendants refutes their argument that Pennell was never assigned
administrative-segregation status prior to the attack; (3) the
December 18, 1997, “recommendation” that he be placed in
administrative segregation was a de facto change in custody,
despite the fact that no hearing had yet been held; and (4) a
hearing was not necessary to officially change his status to
administrative segregation as is evidenced by the fact that upon
his return from the hospital, he was immediately placed in
administrative segregation. No. 01-40277 -3-
Pennell, however, provided no evidence in opposition to
summary judgment that the defendants were aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm existed by placing him in a cell with the inmate who
attacked him. His argument is based on the erroneous assumption
that placing an inmate who is on administrative-segregation
status in a cell with any other inmate is per se evidence of
deliberate indifference. Pennell has not adduced any evidence
which creates a genuine issue of material fact whether the
defendants knew that a serious risk of harm to him would arise by
placing him in a cell with a particular inmate. He has therefore
not shown that the district court erred in its summary-judgment
determination.
Pennell further argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to modify discovery. We review a district
court’s discovery determinations for an abuse of discretion.
Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595, 605(5th Cir.
2001). Pennell’s argument is devoid of an explanation how
discovery would have assisted in creating a genuine issue of
material fact. He has therefore not established that the
district court abused its discretion. See
id. at 606(appellant
must show why additional discovery is necessary and how that
discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact).
AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished