Wilson v. City of New Orleans

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Wilson v. City of New Orleans

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-30135 Summary Calendar

HENRY WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND PERMITS,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (No. 00-CV-3115-R) _________________________________________________________________ October 15, 2002

Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Henry Wilson appeals a summary judgment dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983

action against the City of New Orleans and two of its

departments (collectively “the City”). (He does not contest the

dismissal of his state-law claims.) Wilson contends the City

denied him due process of law by failing to provide sufficient

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. notice of a hearing and adjudication concerning the demolition of

his property in New Orleans.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g., Amburgey

v. Corhart Refractories Corp.,

936 F.2d 805, 809

(5th Cir. 1991).

Such judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-movant, “‘there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to [a]

judgment as a matter of law.’”

Id.

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).

Wilson alleged no specific facts that, if accepted as true,

would establish a municipal policy or custom to provide inadequate

notice, as he must do to establish municipal liability under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moore,

958 F.2d 92, 93-94

(5th Cir. 1992). Allegations of a policy or custom and its

relationship to a constitutional violation cannot be conclusional

but must contain specific facts. See, e.g., Spiller v. City of

Texas City, Police Dep’t,

130 F.3d 162, 167

(5th Cir. 1997) (citing

Fraire v. Arlington,

957 F.2d 1268

, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

506 U.S. 973

(1992)).

Nor did Wilson offer any summary-judgment evidence relevant to

a policy or custom. He contends that a single decision may

constitute a policy or custom, but he does not explain how that

principle applies here. Instead, he asserts that “various

witnesses” will establish “a clear and continuing series of

practices” that violate constitutional due-process requirements.

Needless to say, such conclusions do not avoid dismissal. See Spiller,

130 F.3d at 167

. Because Wilson fails to show a policy

or custom, the judgment is AFFIRMED. See Bickford v. Int’l

Speedway Corp.,

654 F.2d 1028

, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellate

court may affirm “on any grounds, regardless of whether those

grounds were used by the district court”).

AFFIRMED

3

Reference

Status
Unpublished