Raeford Farms of LA v. Luster
Raeford Farms of LA v. Luster
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30327 Summary Calendar
In the Matter Of: RANDALL FARMS, LLC,
Debtor,
---------------------------------------------------
RAEFORD FARMS OF LOUISIANA, LLC,
Appellee,
versus
JOHN W. LUSTER, Trustee,
Appellant.
-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 01-CV-674 -------------------- October 21, 2002
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant, the bankruptcy trustee of Randall Farms, appeals
the holding of the district court, which, in reversing an order
of the bankruptcy court, required him to endorse the certificates
of title of various motor vehicles that were sold by Randall
Farms to a third party and, ultimately, to appellee.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 02-30327 -2-
As an initial matter, it is clear that the district court’s
order reversing the bankruptcy court is final, and, therefore,
subject to appeal. Indeed, so long as a district court order
ends a discrete piece of litigation in a bankruptcy case, such a
case “need not be appealed as a single judicial unit at the
termination of the [bankruptcy] proceeding as a whole.” In re
County Management, Inc.,
788 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1986)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As this matter
involves a discrete piece of litigation, it therefore may be
appealed.
Appellant also asserts that the district court erred in
granting leave to appeal the holding of the bankruptcy court.
Appellee responds that the district court’s granting leave to
appeal the bankruptcy court’s order is interlocutory, and thus
not subject to review. Yet, the order granting leave to appeal
is in fact subject to review, as a final order has now issued
from the district court. Accordingly, the district court’s
granting leave to appeal is subject to our review. To determine
whether the district court’s granting leave of appeal constituted
an abuse of discretion, see
28 U.S.C. § 158(a), an analysis of
the merits of the issue is necessary.
Appellant contends that the vehicles at issue are part of
the bankruptcy estate. Although the certificates of title of the
vehicles have not been signed over to appellee, the sale of the
vehicles had been consummated prior to Randall Farm’s petitioning No. 02-30327 -3-
for bankruptcy, which, under Louisiana law, is sufficient to
transfer ownership of the vehicles. See Zilkha Energy Co. v.
Leighton,
920 F.2d 1520(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the extent
and efficacy of any such judicial lien is determined by state
law); La. Civ. Code art. 2456 (noting that “[o]wnership is
transferred between the parties as soon as there is agreement on
the thing and the price is fixed, even though the thing sold is
not yet delivered nor the price paid”); Wright v. Barnes,
541 So. 2d 977, 979(La. App. 2 Cir. 1989) (“The sale of a motor vehicle
is governed by the civil code articles relating to the sale of
movables, and is not affected by non-compliance with the
requirements of the Vehicle Certificate of Title [Law].”)
(internal citations omitted).
Thus, as appellee owns the vehicles at issue under Louisiana
law, the district court was correct to conclude that appellant
must endorse the certificates of title, a mere ministerial act to
ensure compliance with the administrative proceedings of
Louisiana law. Thus, the district court’s granting leave of
appeal does not qualify as an abuse of discretion and, moreover,
reversing of the bankruptcy court’s order was appropriate.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished