Meador v. Fincher
Meador v. Fincher
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10175 Summary Calendar
RONALD R. MEADOR, also known as Ronald Richard Meador,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN FINCHER, Jailer; MARY BARRON, Lieutenant, Jail Administrator; GLEN SMITH, Sheriff; SCOTT MARTIN, Chief Deputy; DANNY HUTCHIN, Sergeant; RANDY CLARK; RODNEY JAMES,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:99-CV-70-BG -------------------- November 12, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ronald R. Meador, Texas state inmate #867468, appeals the
dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983civil rights action against
various Brown County Jail officials for failing to protect him
from an attack by other inmates and for failing to supervise
subordinate officials. Meador contends that the magistrate judge
(“MJ”), before whom the parties consented to proceed, abused her
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 02-10175 -2-
discretion in various ways during the pretrial proceedings and
erred in granting motions for summary judgments filed by several
of the defendants. Meador has failed to assert, and has
therefore abandoned, any challenge to the MJ’s dismissal of his
claims against Mary Barron and his official-capacity claims
against Scott Martin, Danny Hutchins, and Glen Smith for failure
to state a claim. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff
Abner,
813 F.2d 744, 748(5th Cir. 1987).
There is no merit to Meador’s contentions that the MJ abused
her discretion in various ways during the pretrial proceedings.
Because an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter,
766 F.2d 179(5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 324, n.3(1989), is intended
not as a discovery tool for prisoners, but as a forum for digging
beneath a prisoner’s conclusional allegations, the MJ did not
abuse her discretion in conducting the hearing outside of the
defendants’ presence. See Wesson v. Oglesby,
910 F.2d 278, 281(5th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Barrientos,
926 F.2d 480, 483(5th
Cir. 1991). Meador has failed to show exceptional circumstances
warranting the appointment of counsel, and, thus, the MJ did not
abuse her discretion in denying Meador appointed counsel. See
Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t,
811 F.2d 260, 261(5th Cir.
1986). Since Meador has failed to identify which of his
allegations were not liberally construed or to explain what those
allegations should have been construed to suggest, Meador has not No. 02-10175 -3-
shown that the MJ erroneously failed to construe his pro se
pleadings liberally. As the MJ’s grant of summary judgment was
based not on credibility determinations but on Meador’s failure
to provide evidence controverting that submitted by the
defendants, the MJ did not improperly decide credibility issues
on summary judgment. Finally, the MJ did not abuse her
discretion in denying Meador’s motion for default judgment, as
Meador failed to show extreme circumstances warranting such a
drastic remedy. See Lewis v. Lynn,
236 F.3d 766, 767(5th Cir.
2001).
Meador’s various challenges to the MJ’s grant of summary
judgment are likewise without merit. Even assuming that there
are genuine factual disputes regarding whether the inmates who
attacked Meador forced open the jail’s security gate and which
jail officials first arrived on the scene of the attack, Meador
has failed to explain why those issues are material in this case.
See Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp.,
936 F.2d 805, 809(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact). Despite
Meador’s suggestion to the contrary, the decision of Farmer v.
Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 842(1994), does not mandate that the
issue of deliberate indifference be decided in a trial setting.
The MJ was not required to warn Meador of the consequences of
failing to respond to the summary-judgment motions, as the notice
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local No. 02-10175 -4-
Rules is sufficient. See Martin v. Harrison County Jail,
975 F.2d 192, 193(5th Cir. 1992). Finally, the MJ did not abuse her
discretion in granting summary judgment without allowing Meador
further discovery, as Meador failed to explain how additional
discovery would reveal the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc.,
989 F.2d 1435, 1441-42(5th Cir. 1993).
In light of the foregoing, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished