Mendicino v. Dell Computer

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Mendicino v. Dell Computer

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-50363 Summary Calendar

FRANK D. MENDICINO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DELL COMPUTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (A-01-CA-561-H)

December 3, 2002

Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Frank D. Mendicino, pro se, appeals the summary judgment

granted his former employer, Dell Computer, on his discrimination

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. A summary

judgment, reviewed de novo, is appropriate where, viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare

Sys., LLC,

277 F.3d 757, 762

(2001). Mendicino maintains there are

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. material fact issues concerning whether he was “disabled” as

defined by the ADA and whether Dell knew of his disability.

For an ADA claim, Mendicino must first show he has a protected

disability. E.g., Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,

136 F.3d 1047, 1050

(5th Cir. 1998). Mendicino suffers from hydrocephalus,

a condition in which “an excessive amount of cerebrospinal fluid,

usually under increased pressure, [exists] within the skull”. THE

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE (Charles B. Clayman,

M.D. ed., 1989). The evidence shows that, because of this

condition, Mendicino cannot participate in tumbling, contact sports

or heavy lifting; and he suffers from sporadic seizures, which do

not prevent him from driving a car. Mendicino has failed to make

the threshold showing of disability, because the impairment does

not “prevent[] or severely restrict[]” him from engaging in

activities “of central importance to most people’s daily lives”.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___,

122 S. Ct. 681, 691

(2002);

42 U.S.C. § 12102

(2)(A). See Sherrod v.

American Airlines, Inc.,

132 F.3d 1112, 1120

(5th Cir. 1998)

(holding inability to do heavy lifting is not a substantial

limitation on a major life activity).

Further, even if Mendicino made the threshold showing, he

admits to neither requesting an accommodation nor informing Dell of

his disability until after his termination. “If the employee fails

to request an accommodation, the employer cannot be held liable for

2 failing to provide one.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group,

93 F.3d 155

, 165 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied

519 U.S. 1029

(1996). See

also

42 U.S.C. § 12112

(b)(5)(A) (defining “discrimination” as “not

making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations....” (emphasis added)). Finally, Mendicino asserts

the district court erred in denying several of his motions

including: a motion to appoint counsel, a motion for leave to amend

his complaint, various discovery motions, and a motion for

reconsideration. He also contests the district court’s use of the

magistrate judge. There was no reversible error.

AFFIRMED

3

Reference

Status
Unpublished