IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-20287 Summary Calendar

ROYCE EUGENE MITCHELL, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS; ANTHONY HALL, JR., Houston City Attorney; C.H. BRENHAM, Individually, and as a City of Houston Police Officer; DANIEL JAY SIMMS, Individually, and as a Houston Municipal Court Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-01-CV-1790 -------------------- January 7, 2003

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Royce Eugene Mitchell, Jr., appeals the grant of the

defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state

a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell argues that the

district court erred in holding that he relied upon invalid

authority to support his contention that there are two classes of

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 02-20287 -2-

citizenship and that he should be considered “sovereign.” He also

argues that the district abused its discretion in holding that he

was a “person” required to file suit under

,

arguing that he has the right to bring suit under the Bill of

Rights, and in invoking the Rooker/Feldman doctrine where there had

been no state court judgment. We review a district court’s ruling

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim de novo.

See Oliver v. Scott,

(5th Cir. 2002).

Mitchell’s argument that he, as a “de jure” citizen, has a

right to bring his suit under the Constitution without invoking

is meritless. The district court correctly noted

that we have long harbored a great reluctance to allow the pursuit

of constitutional causes of action directly. Even the most cursory

reading of our case law demonstrates beyond cavil that we have

permitted prosecution of such actions directly under the

Constitution only when necessitated by a total absence of

alternative courses and “no other means” existed to seek “redress

for flagrant violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

When a statutory mechanism is available,

being a

prime example, plaintiffs must invoke its protection. See Hearth,

Inc. v. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare,

(5th Cir. 1980); Hunt

v. Smith,

(E.D. Tex. 1999)).

Without pleading

, Mitchell has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Consequently, we

need not address whether the district court’s alternative holding No. 02-20287 -3-

that the Rooker/Feldman doctrine requires abstention. The judgment

of the district court dismissing Mitchell’s claims is AFFIRMED.