Stovall v. Woods

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Stovall v. Woods

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 02-41164 Summary Calendar ____________________

ROBERT A. STOVALL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

S.O. WOODS, JR., Chief of Texas Department of Criminal Justice State Classification Committee; B. ORMSBY, Correctional Officer; TRACY ALLEN, Chief of Unit Classification Committee; EDDIE WILLIAMS, Unit Warden; B. LORD, Correctional Officer; RICKY D. TARVER, Captain; L. ANDERSON, Correctional Officer; J. HORNBUCKLE, Correctional Officer; REGINALD BROWN, Law Library Supervisor; ROSEMARY HANICAK, Unit Health Administrator; GARY GOMEZ, Regional Director; ROCHELLE MCKINNEY, Registered Nurse; D. LAUDERDALE, Registered Nurse; MICHAEL JACKSON, Correctional Officer; B. BAILEY, Correctional Officer; KEITH RUSSELL, Supervisor; U.P. SORRELS, Correctional Officer; C. SHULL, Correctional Officer; TARA CLARK, Correctional Officer; P. TINCHER, Correctional Officer; D. ARMFIELD, Correctional Officer; MICHAEL DABNEY, Unit Disciplinary Hearing Officer; DAVID ALRIDGE, Correctional Officer; U.P. GLOVER, Nurse; TIM WEST, Warden; Timothy Vanbibber, Unit Grievance Coordinator,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (1:99-CV-260) _________________________________________________________________ February 19, 2003 Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*

Robert A. Stovall, Texas inmate # 790244, proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), appeals the denial of his motion to

supplement his

42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint and the subsequent

dismissal of that complaint. He claimed malicious prosecution,

harrassment, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs,

alleging that defendants filed disciplinary charges against him

for, inter alia, his refusal to shave, despite knowing of his

condition (irritated skin) for which he had been issued a clipper

shave pass exempting him from the shaving requirement. Stovall

also alleged he is HIV-positive and had been denied access to

medical treatment.

The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that Stovall’s claims be dismissed as frivolous and

for failure to state a claim. That report did not address the

claimed harassment or deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Stovall appeals this omission. However, he does not address the

harassment issue in his brief. We will not consider issues an

appellant has failed to raise. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy

Sheriff Abner,

813 F.2d 744, 748

(5th Cir. 1987). And, for his

deliberate indifference claim, Stovall only contends defendants

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

2 were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by

filing disciplinary charges against him for failing to shave.

To obtain relief under § 1983, Stovall must, inter alia,

demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. E.g., Allison

v. Kyle,

66 F.3d 71, 73

(5th Cir. 1995). We review a dismissal

under

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2) of a complaint as frivolous for an

abuse of discretion; a dismissal for failure to state a claim, de

novo. Berry v. Brady,

192 F.3d 504, 507

(5th Cir. 1999).

Stovall mentions on appeal only that he was charged in

disciplinary case 970373246 for refusing to shave. He claims he

was treated with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

condition, but he does not explain the circumstances attendant to

that treatment. Stovall does not mention a denial of due process;

he does not explain what treatment, if any, was denied; and he does

not claim he was deprived of a protected liberty interest.

Although we apply less stringent standards to parties

proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel and

liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants, such litigants must

still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the requirements

of FED. R. APP. P. 28. E.g., Grant v. Cuellar,

59 F.3d 523, 524

(5th

Cir. 1995); Yohey v. Collins,

985 F.2d 222, 225

(5th Cir. 1993).

Finally, the denial of Stovall’s motion to file a supplement

to his complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Knutson,

699 F.2d 230, 239

(5th Cir. 1983).

3 In sum, Stovall’s appeal is without arguable merit and is

dismissed as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Howard v. King,

707 F.2d 215, 219-20

(5th Cir. 1983). This dismissal and the district

court’s dismissal of Stovall’s § 1983 complaint as frivolous each

count as “strikes” under the three-strikes provision of

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons,

103 F.3d 383, 387-88

(5th Cir.

1996);

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B)(ii). Stovall is cautioned that,

if he accumulates a third “strike” under

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(g), he

will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed

while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility, unless he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(g).

DISMISSED; THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished