Palmer v. Griffin

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Palmer v. Griffin

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 1, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III _______________________ Clerk

No. 02-30275

_______________________

LISA T. PALMER; ERNEST NAVARRE, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

STANLEY DWIGHT GRIFFIN; ET. AL.,

Defendants,

STANLEY DWIGHT GRIFFIN; TRAVELERS PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.; SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana Civil Docket #99-CV-2292

_________________________________________________________________

Before GARWOOD, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Palmer and Navarre have appealed a take-nothing judgment,

rendered after a jury trial, in their damage suit arising because

of an auto-truck collision in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.

Appellants contend that the court lacked jurisdiction at least over

Palmer’s claim. They also challenged the jury findings that

neither plaintiff suffered “any injury”; the trial court’s refusal

to grant a new trial; and its ruling on a motion in limine. This

court has carefully considered the arguments in light of the

briefs, oral argument, and pertinent portions of the record. We

find no reversible error.

1. The court could plainly exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Palmer’s claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1367

because

Navarre’s claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit for diversity

purposes, and Palmer’s claim was “so related to claims in the

action within [the court’s jurisdiction] that they form part of the

same case or controversy under Article III . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(a). See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc.,

77 F.3d 928, 931

(7th Cir. 1996) (relying on In re: Abbot

Laboratories,

51 F.3d 524

, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), aff’d. by an

equally divided Court, FREE v. Abbot Labs., Inc.,

120 S.Ct. 1578

(2000)).

2. Based on the substantially controverted evidence at

trial, appellants’ complaint of insufficient evidence to support

the jury verdict lacks merit. To the extent that appellants

contend that the verdict was against the great weight and

2 preponderance of the evidence, and that the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to order a new trial, the standard of review

“is far more narrow than that for denials of judgment as a matter

of law.” Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc.,

163 F.3d 265

,

270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, review of the denial of a new

trial motion is more limited than review of a decision to grant a

motion for new trial. See Whitehead,

163 F.3d at 269

. Finally,

where the motion for new trial is predicated on evidentiary

grounds, denial of a new trial will be affirmed “unless the movant

makes a ‘clear showing’ of an ‘absolute absence of evidence to

support the jury’s verdict.’” Thomas v. Texas Department of

Criminal Justice,

297 F.3d 361, 368

(5th Cir. 2002). Appellants,

having been unable to persuade us that there is an absolute absence

of evidence to support the jury verdict, have not met the difficult

standard.

3. Appellants challenge the district court’s rejection

of their motion in limine concerning certain evidence, but their

brief acknowledges that the court sustained objections at trial to

some of the contested evidence. With regard to evidence of prior

or subsequent injuries, visits to the emergency room by Ms. Palmer,

and references to other claims, litigation and settlements by Mr.

Navarre, appellants failed to reference any caselaw or any specific

portion of the record concerning such evidence. They also failed

to argue, let alone demonstrate, how they suffered prejudice as a

result of the court’s admission of the challenged evidence.

3 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished