United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 24, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III _________________________ Clerk No.02-51170 SUMMARY CALENDAR _________________________ JAMES EDWARD PRICE Plaintiff - Appellant v. COUNTY COURT CLERK OF HILL COUNTY TEXAS, Individually and in his/her official capacity Defendant - Appellee ______________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Waco Division (W-02-CV-133) ______________________________________________________________________________ Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1 James Edward Price, federal prisoner # 82392-80, appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

-1- The district court dismissed appellant’s suit as frivolous after determining it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Price argues that his case is not barred by Heck because it concerns only the county clerk’s dissemination of false information regarding a state conviction, rather than implicating the validity of his federal conviction or sentence. We review a district court’s determination that an IFP suit is frivolous for an abuse of discretion. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).

II.

Price cannot avoid the Heck bar by arguing that his cause of action is based solely on the dissemination of the allegedly false information because, to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defamation claim, Price must demonstrate “a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest.”

San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991). The only mention of injury found in either Price’s brief or his complaint is the use of the allegedly false information in his federal sentencing. Accordingly, Price’s complaint implicitly challenges the duration of his confinement because, if the fact of his prior conviction was false, as he contends, that fact would render Price’s federal sentence invalid. Therefore, under Heck, Price’s argument that he was damaged by the dissemination of false information by the county must be barred, because he has not shown that his sentence “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision to dismiss Price’s complaint as frivolous because it is barred by Heck is AFFIRMED.

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