Without reaching the other grounds for dismissal, we agree with the district court that this action is barred under the Rook-er-Feldman doctrine, because appellant is attempting to overturn the state court judgments denying his requests to vacate the decree of adoption and decree of termination. Those judgments are not void for lack of jurisdiction so as to fall within an exception to the doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that “a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). When the federal “court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review.” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no recognized exception or limitation on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicable to this case. Even if Woosley’s complaint is characterized as a due process challenge to the procedures employed by the state court, the suit in federal court is nevertheless barred. See Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.