Mary Parker appeals a summary judgment on her claims against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“Metro”) for retaliation under title VII and violations of the Equal Pay Act. We review a summary judgment de novo, using the same standards as did the district court. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003). Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

The district court decided first that Parker had not established a prima facie case of retaliation, because her being placed on a witness list and giving a deposition in her co-worker’s state court action for discrimination did not constitute participation in a proceeding under title VII, and was therefore not protected activity. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Because this appeal must be decided on other grounds, we do not pass on the correctness of the district court’s decision on that issue.

The district court alternately determined that had Parker established a prima facie case, she failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Metro’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge were pretextual. Metro states that Parker’s employment was terminated because of her poor performance and failure properly to comply with appropriate policies.

The record indicates that Parker received consistently low performance ratings, that her supervisors believed she was not successfully adjusting to the public sector after years of private employment, that she was put on probation several times and given performance improvement plans with which she did not comply, and that she did not follow particular policies on several occasions. Parker argues that *323 her actions on several occasions were reasonable, but she has failed to provide evidence that she did not violate the policies or that her supervisors’ dissatisfaction with her performance was not the reason Metro terminated her. The district court was correct in entering summary judgment on Parker’s retaliation claim.

II.

The district court also entered summary judgment on Parker’s Equal Pay Act claims. Parker points to two male employees who she alleges are paid more than she is for substantially the same job. The district court decided that Parker’s claim fails because (1) one of these men had actually had a lower starting salary than Parker, but had received merit raises for which Parker was ineligible because of poor performance, and (2) the other man performed a job that was different from Parker’s and for which Parker was not qualified. Summary judgment on this claim was correct.

AFFIRMED.