United States v. Longoria-Contreras

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States v. Longoria-Contreras

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 12, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 00-41187 c/w No. 03-40146 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAFAEL LONGORIA-CONTRERAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (M-93-CR-99-1) --------------------

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Rafael Longoria-Contreras (Longoria)

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

over 1000 kilograms of marihuana and over five kilograms of cocaine

and to maintain locations in which to store the controlled

substances prior to distribution. He was sentenced to 156 months

of imprisonment and five years of supervised release and was

ordered to pay a $17,500 fine. As a result of Longoria’s 28 U.S.C.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. § 2255 motion, he was granted permission to take this direct appeal

out of time.

Longoria argues that this case should be remanded for the

district court to determine the ineffective assistance claims

raised in his

28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion that were dismissed without

prejudice by the district court. He contends that these issues go

to the validity of his conviction and that, given the extensive

history of this case, equity and efficiency require that these

matters be addressed prior to his direct appeal. In his

application to this court for a certificate of appealability (COA)

from the dismissal without prejudice of those claims, Longoria did

not argue that exceptional circumstances existed warranting their

resolution prior to his direct appeal. We denied a COA; and

Longoria has not shown that he is entitled to revisit these issues

here. Because, as Longoria concedes, the record regarding his

ineffective assistance claims was not adequately developed in the

district court, these claims will not be addressed on direct

appeal. See United States v. Navejar,

963 F.2d 732, 735

(5th Cir.

1992).

Longoria contends that the quantity of drugs should have been

proven as an element of the offense and that Apprendi v. New

Jersey,

530 U.S. 466

(2000), renders

21 U.S.C. § 841

and, by

reference,

21 U.S.C. § 846

, unconstitutional. As Longoria

concedes, these arguments are foreclosed by United States v.

Slaughter,

238 F.3d 580

(5th Cir. 2000). Longoria also asserts that the district court erred in

sentencing him by imposing a fine and by imposing the four-level

enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Although the district court

originally expressed concern regarding the assets from which

Longoria could pay a fine, the court subsequently concluded that

there was sufficient evidence in the presentence investigation

report (PSR) to support the imposition of the fine. The court

specifically cited the large sums of money that were paid to

Longoria in the course of the drug conspiracy. Longoria did not

refute this information, and his unsworn assertion, through

counsel, that he did not have any assets left at the time of

sentencing is insufficient to rebut the information in the PSR.

See United States v. Ayala,

47 F.3d 688, 690

(5th Cir. 1995).

Likewise, Longoria has not shown that the district court clearly

erred in applying the four-level enhancement for his having been a

leader or organizer of criminal activity involving five or more

participants or that was otherwise extensive. See United States v.

Cooper,

274 F.3d 230, 247

(5th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.

Reference

Status
Unpublished