Quincy V. Gilford, Jr., appeals from his conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Gilford contends that the district court erred by adjusting his offense level for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense; that the nexus between a firearm and a felony required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be the nexus required for an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5); and that the factual basis for his plea was inadequate because the mere fact that his firearm traveled from outside of Texas at some point in the past did not show a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to confer jurisdiction on the district court.

Gilford, who is represented by the Federal Public Defender, is correct that his contentions regarding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the interstate-commerce nexus are foreclosed. See United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 231-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 942, 157 L.Ed.2d 757 (2003); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150,122 S.Ct. 1113, 151 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2002). Gilford raises those arguments to preserve them for further review.

The district court’s finding that Gilford possessed his firearm in connection with the felony offense of possession of crack cocaine was not clearly erroneous. See Washington, 340 F.3d at 230. The district court could have concluded from the physical proximity of the firearm to a crack cocaine pipe and to crack cocaine that Gil-ford possessed the firearm to protect the *551 crack cocaine. See United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.