Deputy Matt Hooper appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. He argues that: the disputed issues identified by the district court are not material to the qualified immunity determination; the evidence establishes without dispute that Jerry Lynn Anderson posed an immediate and serious threat to him; and his actions were reasonable in light of the threat posed by Anderson. Hooper further argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment with respect to the state-law claim advanced by the plaintiffs because that claim is barred, as a matter of law, by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 101.106.

Although Hooper asserts that his appeal is a challenge to the materiality of the disputed factual issues identified by the district court, his arguments concern the genuineness of those factual disputes. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Consequently, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Hooper’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment with respect to whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Reyes v. City of Richmond, Tex., 287 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2002). 1

Because the determination whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 101.106 bars the state-law claim advanced by the plaintiffs is neither “inextricably intertwined” nor necessary to resolve the question of qualified immunity, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Hooper’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment as to this issue. See Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 805 (5th Cir. 1996).

APPEAL DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.