Oswaldo Calderón-Terrazas appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging his removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he was convicted of sexual assault of a child under Texas Penal Code § 22.011, an aggravated felony. Calderón-Terrazas argues that sexual assault of a child under Tex. Penal Code § 22.011 is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) and 1101(a)(48). Calderón-Terrazas argues further that the “automatic” removal of a long-term lawful permanent resident with significant ties to the United States violates substantive due process. In addition, Calderón-Terrazas asserts that the BIA erred in deciding his case by summary affirmance without opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7).

Contrary to the Government’s assertions, the district court had jurisdiction over Calderon-Terrazas’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition because as an alien who is removable for having committed an aggravated felony, he is precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) from seeking direct judicial review, and his petition raises questions of law only. See INS v. St Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); Flores-Garza v. INS, 328 F.3d 797, 802-04 (5th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, Calderon-Terrazas’s crime of “sexual assault of a child” under Texas Penal Code § 22.011 qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 8 U.S.C. *905 § 1101(a)(43)(A) includes within the scope of the term “aggravated felony” the enumerated crimes of “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” In U.S. v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000) this Court held that in determining whether a specific crime constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” for § 1101(a)(43)(A) purposes, the words of the statute must be read according to “their ordinary contemporary meaning.” Texas Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2)(A) says that “a person commits [the offense of sexual assault] if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means”. This conduct clearly constitutes “sexual abuse of a child”. Sexual abuse of a child is an enumerated crime in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and therefore expressly declared to be an “aggravated felony”.

Furthermore, Calderon-Terrazas’s deferred adjudication under Texas law is a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) because it involved an admission of guilt and limitations on his liberty. See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1999).

The district court determined correctly that the statutes that Calderón-Terrazas challenges as violating his substantive due process rights are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 & n. 16 (5th Cir. 1983).

Also contrary to the Government’s assertions, the district court had jurisdiction to review Calderon-Terrazas’s claim that the BIA erred in using its summary affirmance procedure under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7). See Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court did not err in finding that the BIA properly employed its summary affirmance in this case. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831-33 (5th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, we conclude that Calderón-Terrazas was not denied due process of law and is not entitled to habeas relief.

AFFIRMED.