Santos Montoya, Texas state prisoner #544493, appeals, pro se, the dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion.

Montoya contends: because the district court denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it erred in invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1915A in dismissing his civil rights action. Montoya’s claim is unavailing because § 1915A “applies regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid a filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis ”. Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1998).

Montoya claims the district court erred in denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion, which maintained the pendency of his state and federal habeas applications equitably tolled the two-year limitations period, rendering his civil rights complaint timely filed. Montoya has not demonstrat *799 ed he was prevented from pursuing his § 1983 civil rights claims by the pendency of his state or federal habeas proceedings. See Holmes v. Texas A & M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1998); Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993). The denial was not an abuse of discretion. See Midland West Corp. v. FDIC, 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1990).

Montoya cannot attack his disciplinary proceedings resulting in the loss of good time credits in a § 1983 action until his “convictions” in those proceedings have been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1151, 119 S.Ct. 1052, 143 L.Ed.2d 58 (1999). Because Montoya’s claims call into question the validity of those convictions, he must satisfy the conditions of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), before he can proceed in a civil rights action for damages.

Accordingly, the dismissal is AFFIRMED, but the judgment is MODIFIED to state that his claims challenging his disciplinary convictions are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to then-being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.