Thomas Morrison sued his former employer, Weyerhaeuser Company (“Weyerhaeuser”), alleging that his termination violated, inter alia, title I of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) and gave rise to state law tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“i.i.e.d.”) and invasion of privacy. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Morrison was hired as a shipping supervisor in September 2001, when he was fifty years old. He received extensive safety training, including courses in the plant’s Lock Out, Tag and Try (“LOTT”) procedures, Posted Confined Space Entry Areas, the Roof Access policy, and the Job Safety Analysis (“JSA”) process. As Shipping Supervisor, Morrison had duties that included conducting safety training for employees in his department on the same subjects. Further, he was responsible for the plant’s roof, where the “cyclone system,” a scrap accumulation system for the plant’s finishing and corrugation processes, was located. When the system became clogged, two or three employees had to go to the roof to unclog it.

On November 26, 2002, Morrison was notified that the cyclone system was clogged, so he asked a clerk to tell another employee to meet him on the roof, as required by company policy. He then went onto the roof unaccompanied, in violation of the Roof Access policy. He removed the access hatch to the cyclone, activating a warning that the cyclone was a “confined space area” requiring employees to (1) fill out a non-routine JSA; (2) deenergize moving parts in the equipment pursuant to LOTT procedures; and (3) take all other necessary steps before entering. Morrison did not de-energize the cyclone, but manually inserted a metal rod into the diverter space to free the clog. The diverter activated while his arm was inside, pinning him in the machine. After he radioed for help, a response team deenergized the diverter and rescued him.

Morrison was transported to the emergency room, accompanied by Plant Manager Doug Mitchem and Morrison’s direct supervisor, Victor Self. After Morrison had received an x-ray and two pain shots and medical personnel had determined that he had no broken bones, he was released to go home.

The next day, based on a preliminary investigation by Weyerhaeuser’s Accident Investigation Team, Morrison was issued a three-day suspension for violating the LOTT policy. After further investigation, *584 other safety violations were uncovered, and on December 5, he was terminated for those violations. 1 Mitchem was responsible for the decisions to hire and fire Morrison.

II.

A.

We review a summary judgment de novo and are bound by the same standards as was the district court. Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ‘when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.’ ” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Once the moving party has demonstrated that the non-moving party has no evidence such that a reasonable jury could reach a verdict in its favor, the non-moving party must put-forth specific facts that demonstrate a genuine factual issue for trial. Id.

B.

Morrison claims his termination was age discrimination. To maintain such a claim, a plaintiff must bear the initial burden to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Where only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is available, a plaintiff must show that he (1) was a member of the protected class (over 40 years old); (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was fired; and (4) was either replaced by someone younger, treated less favorably than employees who were similarly situated or was otherwise discharged because of his age. 2

If established, a prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to defendant to proffer a “legitimate nondiseriminatory reason” for its adverse selection. Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897. If defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination is dissipated, and the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove discrimination. Id. at 897 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). “[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, *585 Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

Weyerhaeuser does not contest that Morrison was a member of the protected age group. Even if we assume, as did the district court, that Morrison otherwise properly stated a prima facie case of intentional age discrimination, Weyerhaeuser adequately proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for firing Morrison — the violation of four separate safety violations on November 26 — such that the burden was shifted to Morrison to prove that the proffered rationale was pretextual.

In opposition to summary judgment, Morrison points to evidence in the record that he argues is probative of pretext: (1) testimony of an occupational safety expert; (2) testimony of a handwriting expert; and (3) Morrison’s deposition testimony. 3 Because we agree with the district court that the proffered evidence is not competent to raise an issue of material fact to demonstrate pretext, summary judgment was proper.

The primary evidence that Morrison relies on to show pretext is the testimony of Robert Barr, an expert in occupational safety, but his affidavit does not properly raise an issue of material fact with regard to pretext. Although conceding that Morrison violated the four rules, Barr concludes that the four violations should have been considered to be one incident, and thus under Weyerhaeuser’s disciplinary policies Morrison should have faced, at most, a suspension and retraining.

Barr’s statement, however, appears to be bare opinion, without citation to any source. It amounts to nothing more than his personal feeling that Morrison was treated incorrectly or unfairly — that he was not subjected to “acceptable business practices in the safety industry” — which is not probative of pretext. At issue here is whether the termination was done with discriminatory intent, 4 not whether it was correct from a business, ethical, or personal perspective. 5

*586 Morrison also offered the testimony of a handwriting expert, Jeannett Hunt, who opined that Morrison’s purported initials on a June 4, 2002, non-routine task check sheet were falsified. As the district court correctly noted, this evidence did not raise a material issue of fact with regard to pretext, because Morrison has failed to explain its relevance to the accident or to his termination.

Besides the expert testimony, Morrison’s only summary judgment evidence is his deposition and affidavit testimony to the effect that he believes the rules were used as a pretext to discriminate against him because younger employees who had committed safety violations were merely suspended, not fired. Morrison is able specifically to identify one supervisor, Mitch Mathis, who received different discipline for a safety violation.

The Mathis incident is not probative circumstantial evidence of pretext, however, because the circumstances surrounding his violation were distinguishable as far less severe than those in this case — Mathis committed only one, rather than four violations, and self-reported the infraction. 6 Further, it is doubtful that Mathis can be considered a younger employee for a showing of pretext, because he was in his late forties and thus was in the protected class and was not that much younger than Morrison.

Other than Mathis, Morrison refers to other individual employees only generally, without specific reference to their identities or circumstances. This evidence is. not probative of pretext.

Even if we were to conclude that some of the evidence is probative of pretext, the connection is not strong enough to overcome the “same-actor inference,” which was adopted in Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996). Where the same person is responsible for hiring and discharging an individual, there is an inference that age was not the reason for the discharge. 7

Morrison was both hired and fired within a period of two years by Mitchem. At best, the evidence raises a tenuous inference of pretext, which is insufficient to survive summary judgment in most cases where an employer has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, and particularly so where the same-actor inference comes into play. 8

In sum, because Morrison did not meet his burden to produce evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably find that Weyerhaeuser’s proffered reason for terminating his employment was pretext for age discrimination, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment. 9

*587 C.

Morrison alleges that Weyerhaeuser was guilty of i.i.e.d. when it falsified a safety procedure checklist to assist its efforts to terminate him, and by terminating him. To state a claim of i.i.e.d. in Texas, a plaintiff must show (1) intentional or reckless action (2) that was extreme and outrageous; (3) that caused plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) that was severe. 10 Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is initially a question of law. 11 For conduct to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state an i.i.e.d. claim, it must “go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 12 As a threshold matter, the mere fact that Morrison was terminated is insufficient to state an i.i.e.d. claim; Texas courts have announced that such claims do not attach to the ordinary employment dispute and can exist in only the most unusual of circumstances. 13 Otherwise, the district court was correct in asserting that even if Morrison’s claim of forgery were true, that act was insufficiently extreme and outrageous — as a matter of law — to establish an i.i.e.d. claim. As the court pointed out, the checklist was not used as a basis for the decision to fire Morrison and was not used against him in any way, even to embarrass him.

Morrison’s argument that the alleged forging of initials on the checklists constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct based on Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989), is unconvincing. In Dean, we interpreted Texas law to allow an i.i.e.d. claim where a plaintiff alleged that her supervisor intentionally placed two forged company checks in her purse, because “[mjerely causing the innocent plaintiff to be subject to such an accusation of crime and putting her in fear that it might come passes the bounds of conduct that will be tolerated by a civilized society and is, therefore, outrageous conduct.” Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Morrison was not accused of any crime, so Dean is inapposite. Even if the alleged forgery was illegal or unethical, or the *588 termination was unlawful under the ADEA, that does not necessarily make it sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim for i.i.e.d. 14

Alternatively, Morrison’s claim fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that he suffered the requisite degree of emotional distress. Under Texas law, the emotional distress must be “severe.” 15 “Severe” emotional distress is that which no reasonable person could be expected to endure and must be more than “mere worry, vexation, embarrassment or anger.” 16 Morrison has not sought counseling, therapy or medication and admitted that the distress caused by his discharge was mostly financial. He merely asserts, without citation to evidence, that “[i]t is undisputed that he suffered severe damage,” which is insufficient on its own allow his i.i.e.d. claim to survive summary judgment. 17

D.

Finally, Morrison brought a claim for the Texas tort of invasion of privacy, specifieally that he was subject to an unreasonable intrusion on his private affairs when his supervisor insisted on and was present during his medical examination following the accident. 18 There are three elements to this type of invasion of privacy claim: (1) an intentional intrusion; (2) upon the seclusion, solitude, or private affairs of another; (3) that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 19 Texas courts have added a fourth element — that the intrusion be unreasonable, unjustified or unwarranted. 20 In the employment context, Texas further requires that the employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the matters investigated. 21

The district court correctly found that Morrison cannot sustain a claim for invasion of privacy, because he did not have an expectation of privacy in anything that occurred at the examination. He testified that all that occurred was an x-ray of his hand, and no medical personnel asked him questions. By Morrison’s own admission, *589 nothing private was disclosed, and he did not feel that he was injured by his supervisor’s presence. Under these circumstances, where he was not harmed and had no intention of keeping the revealed information private, Morrison cannot sustain a claim for invasion of privacy. 22

AFFIRMED.