Henry Moore, Jr., appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. He argues the his constitutional rights were denied when the court denied his request to represent himself as well as his request for a continuance. The constitutional protections required at a revocation hearing do not include the right to self-representation. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Moore had the benefit of counsel at the revocation hearing and the court allowed Moore to argue on his own behalf. Moore’s argument that he did not receive timely notice of the charges against him is undercut by counsel’s timely receipt of the rule to revoke. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Moore received a full and fair hearing. See id. The court did not err in denying his request, on the day of the hearing, to represent himself. See United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 973, 124 S.Ct. 446, 157 L.Ed.2d 322 (2003). Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying him a continuance to facilitate self-representation. United States v. Pollani, 146 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.