Troy D. Brown, Sr. is appealing the district court’s order denying his challenge made during the jury voir dire pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Following a jury trial, the district court dismissed Brown’s complaint seeking relief under the civil rights statutes and state law prohibiting malicious interference with employment relations.

Brown argues that the district court erred in upholding the appellees’ reasons for challenging two African-American members of the venire without making a determination that the reasons were pretextual and that the strikes were actually discriminatory. The appellees respond that in failing to dispute the non-discriminatory reasons for the challenges, Brown waived his initial Batson challenge and, thus, the ruling is not subject to appellate review.

The Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the Court outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause: (1) a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised his peremptory challenges on the basis of race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the juror in question; and (3) the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). The principles announced in Bat-son have been applied to challenges to *696 jurors in private civil litigation. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 943 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1991).

A party opposing a challenge to a member of the venire under Batson must prove purposeful discrimination in response to the striking party’s statement of racially neutral reasons for the strike. He cannot rely on his initial objection. See United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990)).

In fading to object to the district court’s determination that the defendants presented racially neutral reasons for their challenges to the African-American members of the venire, Brown waived his Batson claim. Therefore, the denial of the Batson challenge is AFFIRMED.