Oyekunmi Oyelude, a native and citizen of Nigeria, challenges the dismissal and denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his prolonged detention, in the absence of a reasonable bond, violates due process. He specifically reasons that the finding that he is a deportable criminal alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is clearly erroneous. Because the record does not establish that *545 Oyelude is a criminal alien, we vacate that finding, remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this ruling, and express no further opinion as to the merits of the habeas petition.

I.

In September 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 1 charged Oyelude with remaining in the United States without authorization and detained him pending his removal; he applied for release on bond during the pendency of his proceedings. 2 He moved to cancel removal proceedings to allow the INS to adjudicate an 1-130 visa petition that his purported spouse had filed. The IJ ruled against him on the 1-130 petition. 3

In December 2002, the IJ ordered Oyelude removed to Nigeria, denied voluntary departure, and denied his application for cancellation of removal. 4 In April 2003, Oyelude filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus setting forth the factual circumstances surrounding his seven-month detention and alleging that he was about to be deported “without cause.” He asserted that he had no felony convictions, 5 challenged the denial of his 1-130 petition, and argued that the $10,000 bond was unreasonable. He also asked the court to order his release during the pendency of the removal proceedings. 6 The DHS argued that Oyelude’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), as an arrest and detention of an alien pending removal proceedings, and, citing § 1226(e), that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the bond determination.

The district court cited § 1226(c)(1), noting that the Attorney General is required to detain deportable criminal aliens until the final order of removal is issued. The court also relied on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003), for the proposition that mandatory detention of a permanent resident alien does not violate due process. The court denied as moot Oyelude’s motions to stay removal, held that his claims were foreclosed by Kim, and dismissed his § 2241 *546 petition. 7

Oyelude contends that the district court erred in denying his habeas petition on the ground that he was a deportable criminal who had been mandatorily detained pursuant to § 1226(c). He urges us, inter alia, to vacate and remand for further proceedings.

II.

The DHS argues that we have no jurisdiction to consider the Attorney General’s discretionary determination that Oyelude should not be released. Section 1226(e) states that the “Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to judicial review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”

The DHS suggests that the district court dismissed Oyelude’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The order and judgment, however, do not so indicate or suggest. 8 Section 1226(e) may strip us of jurisdiction to review judgments designated as discretionary under the pertinent language of the statute, but it does not deprive us of all authority to review statutory and constitutional challenges. We retain jurisdiction to review Oyelude’s detention insofar as that detention presents constitutional issues, such as those raised in a habeas petition. See Kim, 538 U.S. at 516-17, 123 S.Ct. 1708.

III.

Oyelude argues that the district court erred in finding that he was a criminal alien. We review the district court’s determinations of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. See Royal v. Tombone, 141 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 1998). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “only if it leaves the Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Galvan v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2002).

The district court closes with a quote from Kim: “Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” See Kim, 538 U.S at 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708. The court omits the next, significant sentence: “The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is governed by [the cases cited for the proposition in the previous sentence].” See id. Oyelude has not conceded that he is a criminal alien, so Kim does not foreclose a potential challenge to a § 1226 detention. 9

The district court also cites two unpublished district court cases, Stephens v. Estrada, 2003 WL 21499323 (N.D.Tex. June 19, 2003), and Omari v. Estrada, 2003 WL 21355891 (N.D.Tex. June 5, 2003), for the proposition that Oyelude’s detention is constitutional. These cases are consistent *547 with Kim; the district court’s decision here is not. In Stephens the petitioner had been convicted of assault on a family member, see Stephens, 2003 WL 21499323, at *1, and in Oman the petitioner had been convicted of fifth degree assault of his wife, see Omari, 2003 WL 21355891, at *1. The record in the instant case gives no indication that Oyelude has criminal convictions. 10

Kim dealt with the constitutionality of mandatorily detaining criminal aliens during the pendency of deportation proceedings. Evidently the district court believed that Oyelude was being detained pursuant to § 1226(c), the provision at the heart of the constitutional dispute in Kim, although on appeal the DHS opportunistically implies that the district court approved his detention pursuant to some other provision. 11

Insofar as the district court “found” that Oyelude was being detained as a criminal alien under the authority of § 1226(c), that finding is clearly erroneous. The IJ’s bond decision states that Oyelude was in removal proceedings “as an overstay” and that he “apparently has never been convicted of any criminal matter.” The Attorney General does not contest that finding on appeal. 12

This matter is VACATED and REMANDED so that the district court may consider the foregoing explanation. We express no view as to the ultimate merits of this proceeding.