Henry Gene Laffoon appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for one count of aiding and abetting bank robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Laffoon to 71 months of imprisonment on the bank-robbery conviction and to the statutory minimum sentence of 384 months (32 years) of imprisonment on the firearms convictions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)©, 2113(a).

Laffoon argues that the mandatory minimum sentences imposed on his firearms convictions violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because they fail to take into account his mental retardation. Citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held that the Eighth Amendment protects against the execution of mentally retarded defendants, he argues that the Supreme Court has recognized that persons with reduced mental capabilities do not act with the same level of moral culpability as other offenders. He argues that the mandatory minimums set forth in § 924(c) are unconstitutional because they fail to account for the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded. He makes no other challenge to his sentence. We review the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997).

With the exception of a capital sentence, the imposition of a mandatory sentence without consideration of mitigating factors does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). As the Supreme Court has continually recognized a distinction between capital and noncapital sentences, see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S.Ct. 2680, Laffooris reliance on Atkins to extend its rationale to noncapital cases is unavailing. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.