ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In our previous opinion in this case, we affirmed Defendant-Appellant Hickman’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Hickman, 374 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2004). Following our judgment, Hickman filed a petition for certiorari, in which she challenged for the first time the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines as applied to her. The Supreme Court granted Hickman’s petition for certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We now reconsider the matter in light of Booker and decide to reinstate our previous judgment affirming Hickman’s conviction and sentence.

Because Hickman did not raise any Booker-related challenges to her sentence until her petition for certiorari, we will not review her claim absent extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Taylor, 409 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 2005). Orneases make it clear that an argument not raised in appellant’s original brief as required by Fed. R.App. P. 28 is waived. 2 Appellant argues that based on remarks made by the trial judge at sentencing, she can satisfy the plain-error test discussed in United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520-22 (5th Cir. 2005). Even if appellant can satisfy the plain error test, she has not met the even more exacting test required to show the presence of extraordinary circumstances, which requires appellant to show a “possibility of injustice so grave as to warrant disregard of usual procedural rules.” McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1213 (5th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). For the reasons stated above, our prior *555 disposition remains in effect, and we REINSTATE OUR EARLIER JUDGMENT affirming Hickman’s conviction and sentence.