Reviewing the summary judgment order de novo, we affirm the district court’s decision for the following reasons:

1. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Capers must show (1) that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2004).

2. Capers did not demonstrate an adverse employment action and she therefore failed to make out her prima facie case. On August 9, 1999, Capers entered into a three-year term contract with the Dallas Independent School District. Capers is therefore mistaken in her argument that she was a continuous contract employee when the school board put her on a term of “probation.” To be demoted from a term contract to a probationary contract requires the written consent of the teacher. Tex. Educ.Code Ann § 21.106 (Vernon 2006). Since no such written consent was ever requested or given, Capers was not demoted to a probationary contract. There is no indication that her employment status as a term contract employee was otherwise affected by the decision of the school board to place her on probation.

Affirmed.