Damien Deshong Council appeals his conviction following a jury trial and sentence for possession of a controlled substance (“crack”) with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a felon, and using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Council challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. We have determined that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established Council’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to both counts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, we AFFIRM Council’s conviction as to these counts.

Council argues that the district court enhanced his sentence based on his career offender status in violation of the Sixth Amendment. We have held, however, that a judge’s determination of career offender status does not implicate United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because, except for the defendant’s age, “[cjareer offender status is not ‘a sentencing judge’s determination of a fact other than a prior conviction.’ ” United States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, — U.S. —, — s.ct. -, — L.Ed.2d- (2006) (No. 05-7643). The Government concedes, however, that it cannot meet its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s error in sentencing Council pursuant to a mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme, so-called “Fanfan” error, was harmless. See United States v. Walters, 418 F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Council’s sentence, which included alternative sentences, is VACATED in its entirety and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with Booker.