This matter is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its recent opin *50 ion in United States v. Booker. 1 At our request, Defendant-Appellant Jose Antonio Contreras-Terrazas has submitted a supplemental letter brief addressing the impact of Booker. The government has submitted a motion to reinstate our prior affirmance of his conviction and sentence, which Contreras-Terrazas opposes. For the following reasons, we find that Booker does not affect Contreras-Terrazas’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Contreras-Terrazas pleaded guilty to reentering the United States unlawfully following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court increased Contreras-Terrazas’s offense level under the Guidelines because he had a prior aggravated felony conviction, and the court ultimately sentenced him to 50 months imprisonment. Contreras-Terrazas appealed his conviction challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. We affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 2 Contreras-Terrazas then obtained Supreme Court review on both his conviction and the constitutionality of his sentence under Booker. As noted above, the Supreme Court remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Booker.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Contreras-Terrazas raised his Booker claim for the first time in his petition for certiorari. Therefore, we will not review his Booker claim absent “extraordinary circumstances.” 3 The extraordinary circumstances standard is more demanding than the plain error review that we employ when a defendant has raised his Booker claim for the first time on appeal. 4 Therefore, if a defendant cannot satisfy plain error review, he certainly cannot satisfy extraordinary circumstances review. 5 Contreras-Terrazas argues that the extraordinary circumstances review is inapplicable in this ease for a variety of reasons. As his claim does not survive plain error review, we need not address his objections to the extraordinary circumstances standard.

Under plain error review, we will not remand for resentencing unless there is “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” 6 If the circumstances meet all three criteria, we may exercise our discretion to notice the error, but only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 7 Since Booker, sentencing under mandatory Guidelines constitutes (1) error, and that error is (2) plain. 8 Whether the error affects substantial rights is a more complex inquiry in which the defendant bears the burden of proof, and he carries his burden if he can “demonstrate a probability ‘sufficient to undermine confi *51 dence in the outcome.’ ” 9 The defendant demonstrates such a probability when he identifies from the record an indication that the sentencing judge would have reached a significantly different result under an advisory Guidelines scheme. 10

B. Merits

In his supplemental letter brief, Contreras-Terrazas concedes that he cannot carry his burden under the third prong of the plain error test. Specifically, Contreras-Terrazas is unable to point to any indication in the record that there is a probability that the sentencing judge would have sentenced him differently under an advisory Guidelines scheme. Instead, he urges us to abandon the standard of review we adopted in Mares and instead apply the plain error standard employed by, inter alia, the Fourth Circuit. Mares, however, is the settled law of this circuit, and we can revisit it only en banc or following a Supreme Court decision that effectively overturns it. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed below.

III. CONCLUSION

As there exist no extraordinary circumstances or other grounds for relief, Contreras-Terrazas’s sentence is AFFIRMED. The government’s motion to reinstate our prior affirmance is DENIED as moot.