Rolando Rodriguez-Pinon (Rodriguez) challenges his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for illegal reentry following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Rodriguez’s contention that his prior burglary conviction in Texas does not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) lacks merit in light of United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 420 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1398, 164 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006). His contention that this court did not apply the proper categorical analysis of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), is no more than an argument that Garcia-Mendez was wrongly decided. Garcia-Mendez resolved the issue raised in this case, and one panel of this court may not ignore the precedent set by a prior panel. United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1999). Rodriguez’s conviction for burglary of a habitation was a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) and provided a basis for the district court’s 16-level enhancement of his offense level.

Rodriguez also contends that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). His constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Rodriguez contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and *372 that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Rodriguez properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.