Alejandro Martinez-Vasquez appeals his convictions and sentences for unlawfully attempting to enter the United States af *279 ter deportation following an aggravated felony conviction in 2002 and unlawful presence in the United States after deportation following an aggravated felony conviction in 2005, both in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Martinez-Vasquez challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The Government argues that the waiver provision in Martinez-Vasquez’s plea agreement in relation to his unlawful presence conviction precludes his attack on the constitutionality of § 1326(b) in the appeal of his conviction and sentence in that matter and that, as a result of the waiver, Martinez-Vasquez lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 1326(b) in his appeal of his unlawful presence conviction. We assume, arguendo only, that the waiver does not bar Martinez-Vasquez’s appeal in relation to his unlawful presence conviction.

Martinez-Vasquez’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Martinez-Vasquez contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Martinez-Vasquez properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review. For these reasons, Martinez-Vasquez’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.