Jimmy Diaz, Texas state prisoner # 1201534, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his excessive force claim, which arose from an incident between Officer Mings and Diaz. He contends that Officer Mings used excessive force, causing injuries, and that Officers Basco and Griffen witnessed the incident and failed to provide assistance. Disciplinary proceedings resulted from the incident.

The district court dismissed this action in its entirety based upon Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, the Supreme Court held that to state a claim under § 1983 for a constitutional violation that, if proven, would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that a proper tribunal has held the conviction or sentence invalid. Otherwise, a claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487,114 S.Ct. 2364. Heck applies to disciplinary rulings. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584.

The merits of Diaz’s excessive force claims were addressed only in the district court’s alternative rulings. Diaz fails to discuss in his brief the district court’s conclusion that his complaint should be dismissed as frivolous because it was barred by Heck. He also fails to argue that his excessive force claim should survive the Heck-based dismissal. By failing to address the Heck-based dismissal, Diaz has abandoned the sole issue that is before this court. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.