Plaintiff-Appellant MJCM, L.L.C. d/b/a Pinnacle Financial Services (“Pinnacle”) appeals the district court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment of Defendant-Appellee United Community Banks, Inc., the successor-in-interest to First Georgia Bank (“FGB”). Specifically, Pinnacle contends that the district court erred in (1) finding that FGB experienced a change of control in ownership that would trigger Section 11 of the contract between Pinnacle and FGB; and (2) determining that the contractual phrase “terminated for any reason” was ambiguous and did not apply to terminations caused by a change of control in ownership.

This appeal arises from a dispute regarding a contract for services between Pinnacle and FGB. 1 On August 27, 2002, FGB and Pinnacle entered into a thirty-month contract that allowed FGB to use Pinnacle’s proprietary “Overdraft Privilege Program,” which allows banks to permit depositors to overdraft their accounts without having their checks returned in exchange for a fee paid by the depositor.

Both sides performed under the contract until April 2003, when FGB informed Pinnacle that FGB and its parent corporation were undergoing mergers which constituted a “change in control” that triggered termination of the agreement according to Section 11 of the contract. 2 FGB maintained that, under Section 11, it only owed Pinnacle the fees described in Exhibit C of the contract, which amounted to about $40,000. Pinnacle countered that the catch-all language “terminated for any reason” in Section 12 of the contract included terminations due to a change of control and required payment of additional amounts. 3 Accordingly, Pinnacle argued *325 that FGB owed it $898,950, the total for payments due under Section 12.

Pinnacle sued FGB alleging breach of contract and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Pinnacle appeals the district court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment, so the familiar standards apply. This court reviews a summary judgment de novo, using the same standards applied by the district court. Dallas County Hosp. Dist. v. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, 293 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2002).

After carefully reviewing all submissions by the parties and the record in this case, we affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by the district court. The mergers between the various banking institutions and holding companies in this case occasioned a “change of control in ownership” that triggered the operation of Section 11. The phrase “terminated for any reason,” in the context of Section 12, is ambiguous. “Terminated for any reason” could refer to any reason whatsoever or to the termination events listed in the preceding paragraph. Further, applying Section 12 to Section 11 would render Section ll’s reference to Exhibit C superfluous. Reading the contract as a whole, and giving meaning to all of the contract’s provisions, we hold that a termination under Section 11 does not bring Section 12 into play. See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (holding that contracts should be read as a whole with an effort to give effect to all contractual provisions). In other words, Section 11 contains its own remedy, namely, payment of the fees described in Exhibit C.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

AFFIRMED.