Appellant, Jerry M. Givens (“Givens”) pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a government agency and aiding and abetting following the execution of a plea agreement with the United States. As part of his sentence and pursuant to the plea agreement, Givens was ordered to pay, inter alia, prosecution costs in the amount of $200,000. The plea agreement states in relevant part that:

Givens further agrees that he will pay costs of prosecution in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000.00) Dollars. Givens agrees to assign to the United States Department of Justice as costs of prosecution in this matter, the first $200,000 of the amount payable to him by the Escrow Agent____ Givens further agrees to execute any and all documents necessary to assign the funds to be paid to the United States Department of Justice to insure payment by the Escrow Agent of this cost of prosecution assignment.

Consistent with the plea agreement, Givens and the United States executed the Assignment and Notice to Escrow Agent (the “Assignment Agreement”), in which Givens and other sellers assigned to the United States all of their “right, title and interest in and to the first $200,000 of the Escrowed Funds ... in satisfaction of Givens’ obligation under the Plea Agreement to pay certain agreed costs of prosecution.” At the time the Assignment Agreement was executed, $255,988 was in the Escrow Account. However, the funds were not immediately available to the United States, and on the date the funds were to be released to the United States, charge-offs against the Escrow Account had reduced the account to a negative balance of -$50,397.00.

To enforce its recovery of the costs of prosecution, 1 the government sought a writ of garnishment seeking to garnish Givens’s property. Givens argued that the garnishment should be terminated because the Assignment Agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction of the $200,000 costs of prosecution. The district court overruled Givens’s objection, determining that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction was *424 inapplicable in the context of criminal judgments, and, even if applicable, Givens failed to satisfy the requisite elements of an accord and satisfaction.

We need not decide whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is inapplicable in the context of criminal judgments because there is a clearer ground for affirmance. We conclude that the unambiguous language of the Assignment Agreement fails to satisfy the elements of an accord and satisfaction under Texas law 2 because Givens unambiguously agreed to “pay costs of prosecution in the amount of $200,000.” Thus, there was no dispute about an existing obligation between Givens and the government at the time the Assignment Agreement was executed. 3

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.