Alejandro Gonzalez-Flores (Gonzalez) appeals his guilty plea conviction and sentence for illegal reentry. He argues that his Georgia aggravated assault conviction did not constitute a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) and that the felony and aggravated felony provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), (2) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Using a “common sense approach,” we hold that the generic, contemporary meaning of the offense of aggravated assault includes the intentionally-caused apprehension of injury, 2 W.R. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 16.3 (2d ed. 2005), and that Gonzalez’s Georgia offense falls within that generic, contemporary meaning. United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sanchez-Ruedas, 452 F.3d 409, 411, 414 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 315, 166 L.Ed.2d 237 (2006). We therefore hold *492 that the crime-of-violence enhancement was warranted.

Gonzalez’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Gonzalez contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Gonzalez properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of AlmendarezTorres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.