Jhefry Galindo-Velasquez appeals his conviction of and sentence for illegal reentry. He claims the district court erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based upon its determination that his 2003 conviction under Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a) for indecency with a child was a crime of violence.

The “sexual abuse of a minor” is a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). In United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000), we held that a violation of § 21.11(a)(2) is “sexual abuse of a minor” as that term is used in its “ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning.” Although Zavalar-Sustaita involved an enhancement imposed under a previous version of § 2L1.2, its reasoning remains sound law and is applicable here. See United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270, 273-75 (5th Cir.) (quoting Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 604, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 253, 163 L.Ed.2d 231 (2005)). Accordingly, the district court did not err in enhancing Galindo’s offense level pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).

Galindo challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2). That challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Galindo contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule it in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, — U.S.—, 126 S.Ct. 2873, 165 L.Ed.2d 910 (2006); United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 919, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Galindo properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.