Defendant Martin Anthony Castellón pleaded guilty to a four-count drug indictment, and the district court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 46 months in prison and four years of supervised release on each count. Castellón now appeals his sentence, claiming that the district court should not have considered a prior Texas deferred adjudication proceeding for the purpose of enhancing his sentence. We AFFIRM.

I.

On October 5, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Castellón and a co-defendant on four counts: (1) conspiracy to import marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), and 960(a)(1); (2) importation of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1); (3) conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1); and (4) possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government also filed a bill of information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, 1 notifying Castellón that it intended to seek enhanced punishment based on a prior Texas state conviction for possession of more than 5, but less than 50, pounds of marijuana in December 2004.

Castellón objected to the notice of enhanced punishment. He asserted that, because the Texas prosecution resulted in the imposition of deferred adjudication probation, it was not a “final” conviction and could not be used to enhance his sen-fence under the enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See id. § 841(b)(1)(D) (providing enhanced punishments for convictions involving less than 50 kilograms of marijuana if the offense occurs “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final”). After a hearing, the district court overruled Castellon’s objection.

On January 11, 2006, Castellón pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to all four counts of the indictment. Before Castellón was sentenced, the probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report. In its calculation of the relevant advisory sentencing guidelines range, the presentence investigation report attributed a total of three criminal history points to Castellón based on the Texas deferred adjudication conviction (one point for the sentence itself, and two points because the current offense was committed while Castellón was on probation for the Texas conviction). Castellón objected to the presentence investigation report’s criminal history calculation, again asserting that the Texas deferred adjudication was not a “final” conviction and could not therefore be considered. The district court overruled Castellon’s objection and sentenced him to 46 months in prison on each count, the sentences to be served concurrently. The district court also imposed concurrent four-year terms of supervised release on each count. The sentence imposed by the district court was at the bottom of the advisory guidelines *496 range calculated by the presentenee investigation report.

II.

As an initial matter, it is not altogether clear whether Castellón appeals only the use of his Texas conviction as a trigger to the enhanced penalties available under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), 2 or whether he also appeals the use of the Texas conviction in calculating his criminal history category under the advisory sentencing guidelines. The argument heading in Castellon’s brief suggests the former, but Castellón appears to raise both arguments in the text of his brief. For the sake of completeness, we consider both.

Castellón does not dispute that, under binding precedents of this court, questions about the effect that a prior state conviction is to be given for federal sentencing purposes, whether under the advisory sentencing guidelines or the sentence enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841, is a question of federal law. See United States v. Vasquez, 298 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (21 U.S.C. § 841); United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1998) (U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 & 2). Nor does Castellón dispute that this court has previously held that a Texas deferred adjudication can be considered a prior sentence or prior conviction under both the sentencing guidelines and section 841. See Vasquez, 298 F.3d at 358-60; Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d at 201-02.

Rather, Castellón argues only that the district court’s decision to permit his 2004 Texas deferred adjudication to be used to enhance his sentence violates the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 3 which provides that the judicial proceedings of other states “shall have the same full faith and credit within every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”

Although this court does not appear to have previously addressed Castellon’s full faith and credit argument, the argument is meritless. The Full Faith and Credit Act obligates federal courts to give effect to the judgments of state courts, but the principles that underlie the Full Faith and Credit Act are simply not implicated when a federal court endeavors to determine how a particular state criminal proceeding is to be treated, as a matter of federal law, for the purpose of sentencing the defen *497 dant for a distinct and unrelated federal crime. A number of other circuits have reached this same conclusion, and we are aware of no decisions to the contrary. See United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he principles of federalism and comity embodied in the full faith and credit statute are not endangered when a sentencing court, not questioning the propriety of the state’s determination in any way, interprets how to apply New York’s youthful offender adjudications to a Guidelines analysis.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[Djoctrines such as Full Faith and Credit, ... and related jurisdictional principles, are inapplicable ... where the issue is the role of prior state convictions in a federal sentencing scheme.”); United States v. Carter, 186 Fed.Appx. 844, 847 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“It does not accord a state judgment less than full faith and credit for a federal court to determine its effect on a subsequent federal sentence under federal law.”). Accordingly, we reject Castellon’s argument that the Full Faith and Credit Act prohibited the district court from considering his Texas deferred adjudication for sentencing purposes.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Castellon’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.