Proceeding pro se, Willie Clark, Jr., challenges the dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action concerning the defendants’ attempt to execute an arrest warrant at his home.

Regarding the dismissal of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, Clark has waived any related argument due to inadequate briefing. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas, 197 F.3d 173, 193 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

As for Clark’s Fourth Amendment claim, the summary judgment awarded the defendants is reviewed de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. E.g., Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Such judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Clark fails to show a violation of his constitutional rights in connection with the defendants’ entry into his home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Concomitantly, he fails to show the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. See Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the summary judgment was proper.

Because his action was properly dismissed pursuant to the defendants’ motions, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Fed. R.CivJP. 56(c), Clark’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel is denied. His motions to dismiss his indictment and for new counsel in his criminal proceedings are also denied. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999); Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3).

AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED.