Errick Jermaine Areeneaux, prisoner # 376350, alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that prison officials used excessive force and fractured his wrist during a cell-entry. He also alleged that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Areeneaux appeals the district court’s judgment that dismissed his deliberate indifference claims and granted summary judgment on his excessive force claims. We review the dismissal of Areeneaux’s complaint and the grant of summary judgment de novo. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); Whittaker v. Bell-South Telecomms., Inc., 206 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 2000)

Prison officials violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when they demonstrate deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice are insufficient to give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).

Arceneaux’s deliberate indifference allegations were not ignored; prison officials provided evaluation of his medical complaints in the prison infirmary and later in the hospital. Although the wist fracture was not initially diagnosed, the fracture was not objectively obvious, and Areeneaux conceded in his complaint that upon initial evaluation, he told prison personnel that he would be all right. The failure by the defendants to detect the fracture may constitute negligence or malpractice, but such conduct does not amount to a constitutional violations under § 1983. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2004); Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Arceneaux’s deliberate indifference claims.

Arceneaux’s claims that he did not cause a disturbance while in his cell; he did not refuse orders given to him by prison officials; the use of chemical spray was unjustified; the cell-entry was unprovoked; and that the disciplinary reports were fabricated are barred by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648-49, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (applying *878 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) to prison disciplinary proceedings). Arceneaux’s claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary convictions, and he has not shown that the disciplinary convictions were reversed or expunged. Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Heck barred these claims.

Finally, Areeneaux argues that' the district court erred in determining that the prison officials did not use excessive force during the forced cell-entry. Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Whittaker, 206 F.3d at 534. The core judicial inquiry in determining whether prison officials used excessive physical force is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously or sadistically cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

Competent summary judgment evidence established that the force used by the prison officials was necessary in order to maintain order and restore discipline. In addition, the medical evidence relative to Arceneaux’s wrist injury does not support a finding that the defendants used malicious and sadistic force to cause harm to Areeneaux. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995.

AFFIRMED.