Kenyoun Gilyard appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea *654 conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. He argues that the district court clearly erred by applying a two-level enhancement for his possessing a firearm during a drug crime under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). We review the district court’s firearm adjustment under § 2Dl.l(b)(l) for clear error. United States v. Eastland, 989 F.2d 760, 770 (5th Cir. 1993).

While there was no evidence that Gil-yard carried a firearm when he sold drugs, the evidence showed that Gilyard carried firearms and used them in confrontations and gun battles relating to the drug conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court’s application of the enhancement was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1094 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 161 F.3d 256, 256 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Gilyard argues that the district court clearly erred by applying the four-level enhancement for his being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving four or more participants pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). He assumes without admitting that the Government proved that he was a leader or organizer of a criminal activity involving himself and his three co-defendants. He maintains that the Government did not prove the existence of a fifth participant in the criminal activity by a preponderance of the evidence.

The evidence before the district court showed that Ronald King and Shelby King, as well as Gilyard and his three co-defendants, were participants in the criminal activity. While there was no evidence that Gilyard organized or led Ronald or Shelby King, this is immaterial as the enhancement was proper if there were five or more participants in the criminal aetivity, and Gilyard organized or led at least one other participant. See United States v. Okoli, 20 F.3d 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court’s application of the enhancement was not clearly erroneous. See id.

Gilyard argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by enhancing his advisory guidelines sentence range and sentence based upon facts not admitted by him or found by a jury. As he concedes, this argument is foreclosed. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 828, 126 S.Ct. 43, 163 L.Ed.2d 76 (2005).

AFFIRMED.