Marion J. Beason, Louisiana prisoner # 275660, appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. This court granted a certificate of appealability on the issue whether trial counsel was ineffective with respect to advising Beason about his parole eligibility. Beason argues that the trial judge, trial *110 counsel, and the prosecutor conspired to coerce him to plead guilty and that the trial judge should have recused himself. The court lacks jurisdiction to hear these issues. See § 2253(c)(2); Brooks v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 2005).

“To prove prejudice for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the habeas petitioner must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Bond v. Dretke, 384 F.3d 166, 167-68 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).

The record contains evidence that counsel did misadvise Beason that his was eligible for parole, when in fact the relevant statutes prohibited parole. Nevertheless, Beason cannot establish prejudice because the guilty plea transcript reflects that the trial judge advised Beason on two occasions that he would not be eligible for parole should he plead guilty. Beason affirmed that he understood the court’s admonishments. See United States v. Lampazianie, 251 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, Beason cannot demonstrate that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted upon going to trial. See Bond, 384 F.3d at 168.

AFFIRMED.