Gilberto Chavez-Sifuentes appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for being found in the United States following a prior deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Chavez-Sifuentes argues that the district court erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) because his prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. He contends that the Texas crime of aggravated assault has a broader definition than most other definitions of aggravated assault because it may be committed by threatening the victim with a weapon. The Texas statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02, is substantially similar to the definition of “aggravated assault” under the Model Penal Code and thus qualifies as the enumerated offense of “aggravated assault” under the Guidelines. See United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 199-201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 418, 169 L.Ed.2d 293 (2007).

In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 *325 (2000), Chavez-Sifuentes challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. This argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). United States v. Pinedas-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 872, 169 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.