Jeremy Jason Morefield pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 3 of an indictment charg *372 ing him with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and has appealed his sentence. Morefield contends that his two prior Texas convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver should not have been regarded as “controlled substance offense[s]” for purposes of applying the career-offender Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a) & (b). He contends that the Guideline defining the term “controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), does not use the term “deliver” in describing this category of offenses. We recently rejected this argument in United States v. Ford, 509 F.3d 714, 714-17 (5th Cir. 2007).

Morefield argues that “[tjhere is insufficient detail in the Presentence Report to make a factual determination that ... [Morefield] pled to conduct that falls within the definition of a controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Because this contention has been raised for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Ochoa-Cruz, 442 F.3d 865, 866-67 (5th Cir. 2006). Morefield does not dispute that his prior convictions were for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, an offense that we determined in Ford was equivalent to the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. See Ford, 509 F.3d at 717. For that reason, he has not shown that his substantial rights were affected. See Ochoa-Cruz, 442 F.3d at 867. The judgment is AFFIRMED.